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As the demand for skilled labor continues to rise, the College Completion agenda has become 
more important than ever in our higher education discussion and policy. The agenda has created 
an atmosphere of support for evidence-base policies that improve completion rates and promise 
gainful employment. As such, my dissertation explores two potential solutions to meet the 
shortage of college graduates and examines the academic and labor market outcomes of students 
engaged in these paths. These solutions include transfer from four-year to two-year colleges and 
providing financial incentives for summer classes. These strategies have the potential to help 
students with graduation and become competitive in the job market. My dissertation also has 
important implications for colleges and policy makers that work with non-traditional students 
and especially those with financial constraints. My dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter one explores student transfer from four-year to two-year (4–2) college and how 
improved academic match through transfer can benefit individuals. Facilitating student transfer 
from two-year to four-year institutions has been a focus of research and policy in recent years. 
Much less attention has been given to the phenomenon of four-year to two-year (4–2) college 
transfer. About 16 percent of students who begin in a four-year college transfer to a two-year 
college within six years. I develop a stylized model to explain how 4–2 transfer among 
struggling students can increase academic match and academic and labor market outcomes. 




year college as an instrumental variable, this paper examines the effects of 4–2 transfer on 
“struggling” students, those who earned less than a 3.0 grade point average in the first term. 
Results indicate that these 4–2 transfer students are more likely than similar non-transfer students 
to attain two-year college credentials (including associate degrees and long- and short-term 
certificates); the gain is concentrated in women who tend to enroll in health-related programs. 
What is more, struggling students who transfer to two-year colleges and are sensitive to the IV 
are no less likely than struggling non-transfer students to earn a bachelor’s degree. Early 
employment outcomes also indicate that the labor market does not penalize 4–2 transfer behavior. 
Female 4-2 transfer students actually are more likely to be employed than other female non-
transfer students. Male transfer students, however, suffer a wage penalty from transferring 
without ever completing a degree. Falsification tests show strong first stage results and no 
correlation between distance and socioeconomic indicators, which supports the use of distance as 
an instrumental variable for 4–2 transfer status. The findings indicate that 4–2 transfer can 
improve college completion for students struggling in four-year institutions. 
Chapter 2 discusses an understudied solution to completion – summer enrollment. 
Despite rich evidence on the benefit of summer enrollment at the K-12 level, the college 
completion literature has so far focused on college readiness, remediation, and financial aid, and 
has largely overlooked the potential benefits of taking summer courses among college students. 
Academic momentum theory suggests that summer enrollment may increase credit accumulation 
and retention and thus increase the rate of college completion. Using proximity to the closest 
four-year college as an IV, I analyze public higher education data from an anonymous state to 
examine how enrolling in summer credits can impact college outcomes and the mechanisms by 
which it may do so. I find that summer enrollees who live closer to a four-year institution in the 




enrollees also returned to college at a higher rate and completed more credits in the following fall 
without compromising their grade point averages. Encouragingly, students with lower first-term 
grade point averages benefitted more from summer enrollment. When summer enrollees reached 
the labor market, they had higher employment rates six years after initial enrollment. Conditional 
on employment, earnings were equivalent among summer enrollees and non-enrollees. These 
findings indicate that summer enrollment benefits students through retention, which leads to 
higher rates of completion and employment. The results suggest that colleges may want to seek 
opportunities for increasing summer enrollment, and they have implications for the current 
method of Pell Grant allocation, which privileges the fall and spring terms over the summer term. 
Chapter 3 answers the question of whether financial aid for the summer leads to 
enrollment, completion, and earnings gains. Despite being the largest source of financial aid to 
low-income college students, the Pell grant has one major limitation: if students enroll in two 
semesters full-time, they will not have any tuition support for the third semester of the same 
academic year. The year-round Pell (YRP) was implemented in the academic years 2009-10 and 
2010-11 to provide a second Pell grant to students who enrolled in more than 24 credits prior to 
the third semester and in at least 6 credits during the third semester. My paper is the first to 
employ a difference-in-difference approach to examine the completion and labor market 
outcomes resulting from the YRP using a state administrative dataset from a community college 
system. I find that for each $1,000 of additional YRP grant funding, summer enrollment 
increases by 28 percentage points and associate degree completion rate increases by 2.4 
percentage points, with these gains primarily benefitting adult students who enrolled at age 20 or 
above. Given that the federal government is considering reinstating the YRP, my research is 
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As the college wage premium continues to rise drastically due to the increased demand 
for skilled labor, the supply of college graduates has not been able to keep up (Acemoglu & 
Autor, 2011; Goldin & Katz, 2008; Katz and Murphy, 1992). By 2018, the United States will 
need 22 million new workers with college degrees. Despite the substantial progress in college 
enrollment in the past 40 years, we are still at least 3 million short of that goal. In particular, low-
income and minority students are much less likely to graduate even after controlling for 
academic ability (Bailey & Dynarski, 2011; Carneavle, Smith & Strohl, 2010).  
Alongside the shortage of college graduates is an ongoing decline in state financing of 
higher education. Financial support to two-year and four-year public colleges has suffered for at 
least two decades, and the recession has made an even deeper cut to the postsecondary education 
budget (Kane & Orszag, 2003). Though some degree of restoration is being seen in some states 
after the recession, the level of state financing is still $10 billion or 18 percent per student below 
the level pre-recession (Mitchell, Leachman, & Masterson, 2016). 
Declining funding for public colleges concomitant with expanding enrollment inevitably 
means surging tuition and fewer resources for each student as a result of faculty hiring freezes, 
more temporary faculty, fewer course offerings, reliance on online education, less non-academic 
support, and campus closures. All of these threaten the quality and affordability of higher 
education, especially for marginal students with stricter credit constraints. 
Facing the challenge of both limited resources and an expanding demand for higher 
education, we need to come up with innovative solutions to facilitate helping college students 
graduate in a timely and cost-effective manner. My dissertation evaluates the academic and labor 




Focusing on four-year students with academic struggles, Chapter 1 develops a stylized 
model to rationalize transfer from four-year to two-year colleges. It hypothesizes that when 
students are academically overmatched for their initial four-year institutions, transferring to two-
year institutions may create a better match and therefore more successful outcomes. As more 
states have made community college free, four-year to two-year transfer is an increasingly 
effective way to reduce the shortage of college graduates. 
Chapter 2 suggests students can use summer enrollment to speed up graduation and 
maintain academic momentum to graduate. Chapter 3 finds that financial incentives for summer 
enrollment conditional on accumulated credits can be an effective way to increase summer 
enrollment and positive labor market outcomes. 
My dissertation highlights evidence that both strategies can increase college completion 
rates, and some students have already begun to transfer from four-year to two-year colleges and 
start attending colleges in the summer. As policymakers and college administrators continue to 
adapt to the needs of college students in this generation, they may need to explore new ways, 
including the strategies suggested in my dissertation, to improve college outcomes and keep up 









Do Students Benefit From Transferring Down? The Academic and 




Is it ever a good investment to transfer down from a four-year to two-year institution (4-2 
transfer)? As Manski and Wise (1983) said “college entry is an experiment that does not 
necessarily lead to a college degree.” According to the U.S. Department of Education (2015), 
only 39 percent of first-time, four-year students who entered college in 2007 completed at the 
first institution they attended within four years, and only 59 percent did so within six years. 
Students are especially at risk of dropping out if their first-year grade point average (GPA) is 
under 3.0. Indeed, the Education Advisory Board has reported that while most institutions 
classify the students at risk of dropping out as those with GPAs below 2.0 in the first year, the 
completion rate drops down to as low as 12 percent for the “murky middle,” those with first-year 
GPAs between 2.0 and 3.0 (Tyson, 2014). These struggling students are more likely to be 
students of low socioeconomic status (SES) who have been historically underrepresented in 
higher education (Walpole, 2003).  
For struggling four-year students who wish to complete a college degree, one option is 4-
2 transfer. Each year, appropriately 16% of the four-year college students transfer to a two-year 
institution (Hossler et al., 2012b). On the one hand, two-year colleges give those who otherwise 
may drop out of a four-year college a chance to continue their postsecondary education. On the 




institutions with more credentialing options and instead group them with peers who have lower 
aspirations.  
These 4-2 transfer students may perceive that they have a lower likelihood of success at 
their original institution. Struggling students at four-year colleges may also have compelling 
financial reasons to transfer to two-year colleges, since two-year college is substantially cheaper. 
For the 2015–16 school year, public four-year students paid $4,000 on average after deducting 
financial aid and tax credits, and many spent an additional $10,140 on average on room and 
board. In contrast, two-year students had an average net tuition/fee of $0 due to Pell Grants, and 
many of them lived at home (Baum, Ma, Pender, & Bell, 2015). Furthermore, two-year 
institutions offer credentials at least two years more quickly at more convenient locations and 
with more flexible schedules than four-year colleges. The opportunity cost of attending two-year 
colleges is therefore also potentially much lower.  
We know very little about the potential benefits of 4–2 transfer, and the phenomenon 
itself has not been the subject of much discussion in the academic literature. Past studies have 
looked at 4–2 transfer outcomes only descriptively or through propensity score matching. Most 
of the 4–2 transfer literature is qualitative and focused on a single school system or region. Even 
among the three national quantitative studies, researchers often directly compared 4–2 transfer 
students with either four-year dropouts or with four-year students who never transfer, both of 
whom are likely to be very different from 4–2 transfer students (Hossler et al., 2012a; Kalogrides 
& Grodsky, 2011; Yang, 2007). Only one study that I am aware of has attempted to examine the 
economic value of 4–2 transfer using propensity scores matching (Kalogrides & Grodsky, 2011).  
In this paper, I develop a stylized model to rationalize transfer decision based on the job 
matching and academic match theory (Jovanovic, 1979; Light and Strayer, 2000; Yang 2007). 




year colleges. The match quality is determined by the match between the college and student’s 
ability and circumstances. Over time, individuals update their belief of the match quality, which 
influences their perceived completion rate and future earnings. As the value of transfer becomes 
higher than the value of staying, transfer happens. 
My key contribution is to provide one of the first quasi-experimental examinations of the 
effect of 4-2 transfer on students using a detailed state-level administrative data on 2005–06 to 
2007–08 student cohorts. Second, I also look at the short-term labor market outcomes in 
additional to academic outcomes of 4-2 transfer students. Third, I limit the sample to students at 
risk of dropping out—those who have a GPA below 3.0 in the first term to focus on students 
transferring due to academic difficulties. I further define 4-2 transfer students as those who have 
ever taken a course in the fall or spring semester at a two-year college to exclude high achievers 
who attend two-year colleges strategically. 
I address the endogeneity issue due to student’s selection in transfer process by using the 
distance from high school attended to the closest two-year college as an instrumental variable 
(IV). The IV strongly correlates with a four-year student’s 4–2 transfer status, yet it does not 
correlate with socioeconomic indicators nor does it predict the outcomes of two-year students 
supporting my specification assumptions. The first stage results show that the instrument only 
works with struggling students, since they are more sensitive to proximity to two-year college 
than students with at least 3.0 GPA in the first term.   
I found that among my sample of struggling four-year students, transfer students who are 
sensitive to distance are no less likely to earn a bachelor’s degree than non-transfer students. The 
IV estimates show that female struggling 4–2 transfer students were, straightforwardly, more 
likely to earn two-year college credentials relative to their peers who did not transfer. The high 




related major, which have higher completion rates in general. The strength of distance as an IV is 
much smaller for men than for women and thus no statistically significant gains were found 
among male 4-2 transfer students. Struggling 4–2 transfer students and non-transfer students also 
had similar earnings and employment rates five to seven years after enrolling in the initial four-
year institution. These results suggest that two-year colleges can be beneficial for four-year 
students who struggle academically in college. Nonetheless, a longer follow-up period would be 
ideal to provide a proper evaluation of the long-term employment outcomes of 4–2 transfer. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 To explain 4 –2 transfer behavior, I develop a stylized model based on the job match 
theory (Jovanovic, 1979). College transfer resembles job turnover in a number of ways: (1) 
college and job experience are both experience goods, through which students or employees 
learn about the match quality after the initial match (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2012).; (2) it 
is the students or workers’ initiative to break the match, which occurs when the individuals 
realize that the match quality is below their reservation match quality and the value of separation 
is higher than that of staying; (3) college transfer rate also declines with time spent in the initial 
college just as job separation becomes more rare as workers stay longer on the same job.   
 A major separation from the job match theory is that my model does not allow schools to 
influence students’ total output (probability of completion) other than through providing 
education, which is assumed to have same quality over all students.  
 Let us assume  is the probability of graduating from the initial four-year college over 
a period of time t, and let 




where  and  are constant and both  and t are positive.  is normally distributed with mean 
zero and variance t. So  is also normally distributed with the mean of  and variance .  
While  is assumed to be identical for each individual, the match quality  is different 
across matches. The match quality is unknown prior to forming a match and is only discovered 
after students enroll. The better the match, the higher  is. The match depends on school quality 
and student ability, financial resources, sudden shock, and other competences required for 
completing four-year degrees.  
The typical human capital and earnings models assume that individuals are fully 
informed about the earnings potential and the nature of college experience before making the 
decision regarding the level of education that they will complete. In reality, students do not have 
perfect information and education is a sequential choice made under uncertainty (Manski, 1989; 
Altonji, 1993). As a result of imperfect information, many students enter four-year colleges with 
an over-optimistic view of their probability of completion. Students often begin to learn more 
about the true cost and benefits of education after matriculating in a four-year (Stinebrickner & 
Stinebrickner, 2012).  
 Relating education attainment to perceived wages, individuals will receive ,  
with t semester of education. Age is not part of the wage function since all individuals are of 
similar age having enrolled in college for the first time. 
 The present value of transferring from a four-year to a two-year college is Q: 
, .        (2) 
The term ,  indicates the present value of transfer with ∙  as the perceived returns to 
two-year education and the value of leaving the initial four-year school as . Let c be 




Under this simplified model, students would transfer from a four-year to two-year college 




The administrative dataset used for this study contains data on first-time-in-college, 
degree-seeking students from the public higher education system of a geographically small state. 
These students were first enrolled in the academic years 2005–06, 2006–07, and 2007–08 and 
were followed for approximately five to seven years, through the summer of 2013. The system 
consists of over 30 two-year and four-year institutions of various sizes in rural, urban, and 
suburban settings. The sample contains approximately 16,000 beginning four-year and 16,000 
beginning two-year students for the above time frame.  
To determine whether my sample resembles students first-time enrolled in four-year 
colleges, I also compare the sample characteristics of my state sample to the national Educational 
Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS) data, which are nationally presentative of high school seniors 
in 2003. 
The major advantage of my state’s dataset in the study of 4–2 transfer students is the 
term-level transcript data that allows distinguishing between students who are transferring and 
students who are only taking summer classes in between terms at a four-year college.  
In addition, this dataset is useful for addressing some of the methodological challenges 
found in the previous literature because it contains data on both four-year and two-year students 




demographic information, no transfer study has examined cohorts who entered school after the 
2000s. The dataset also contains detailed transcript records that include student majors and 
specific course information for all courses taken and institutions attended in the state system. 
These details enable me to control for any major- or institution-specific effects of 4–2 transfer.  
The dataset contains information on student demographics, high school attended 
(including institution name, high school GPA, and admission standardized test scores), college 
transcripts for any public institution attended (which include major and degree information, 
courses taken and grades received, course delivery format, and duration of study), and 
employment outcomes from Unemployment Insurance records (with quarterly earnings adjusted 
to 2010 dollars as well as industry codes).  
While I use the entire dataset for descriptive statistics and validity testing, I conduct my 
main analysis with a sample of students who started at four-year colleges intending to receive a 
bachelor’s degree with first-term GPAs below 3.0. This sample contains approximately 7,500 
beginning four-year students, in which 25 percent have taken a course at a two-year college in 
the fall or spring semester and another 10 percent have done so only in the summer. I define the 
students that have enrolled in a two-year college in the fall and spring as struggling 4–2 transfer 
students. 
Despite the strength of the dataset, it has several shortcomings. First, it only contains 
transcript records from the state’s public system, which prevents examination of students who 
started in or transferred to out-of-state or private colleges. Fortunately, the 4–2 transfer rate in 
my sample is comparable to the national rate. About 35 percent of the struggling students in my 
state have ever transferred to any two-year college. The corresponding percentage is 37% 




students in public four-year college have ever transferred, as compared to 30 percent for students 
at private non-profit institutions, and 52 percent at for-profit colleges. 
Besides, the presence of private college students is small among 4–2 transfer students. 
According to the U.S. Department of Education (2006), about 85 percent of four-year students in 
the current state began at a public university while the percentage is 65 percent nationally for the 
2005-06 cohort. My calculations from Hossler et al. (2012a) also indicate that 98 percent of 4–2 
transfer students transfer to public two-year colleges nationally. Thus my results and analysis 
still provide meaningful estimations for an average 4–2 transfer student. 
Second, the earnings data do not cover out-of-state workers, military personnel, some 
federal personnel, independent contractors and self-employed individuals, and laborers in the 
informal sector. The Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests that about 10 percent of civilians are not 
included in the UI data, mainly because they are independent contractors (see Stevens, 2007). 
Reassuringly, the coverage in the current data is high. As much as 98 percent of the individuals 
have at least one earnings record within five years after they enrolled. 
Finally, the data have no direct information on the socioeconomic status (SES) of 
individuals. Since one of the concerns with using distance as an IV is that residences may 
correlate with SES, I merged the data with county-level SES indicators at the time of college 
entry to be included in the regressions and falsification tests. These indicators are from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the State Department of Health, such as household income, per 
capita income, percentage of drinkers or smokers, proportion of mothers under 20 years old, 
percentage of residents without health insurance, and percentage of students receiving free or 





 The goal of this study is to examine whether 4–2 transfer can be beneficial to students 
who struggle academically at a four-year college. The reason to exclude high achievers is that 
they tend to strategically enroll in two-year colleges and have very different motivation as 
struggling students, who tend to do so due to academic or other kinds of difficulties. To capture 
the effect of 4–2 transfer on struggling students as opposed to high achievers, I restrict the 
sample to students who exhibited academic difficulty, defined as having a first-term GPA below 
3.0.1 Figure 1.1 presents the relationship between first-term GPA and the six year graduation rate 
using this sample. It shows that any students with a first-term GPA below 3.0 had a less than 50 
percent chance of graduating.  
Table 1.1 presents the student characteristics of the full sample by transfer status and 
first-term GPA. Around 33 percent of struggling student engaged in 4–2 transfer in the non-
summer months, and around 22 percent of high achievers did so. The group of interest is students 
who have ever attended a two-year college in the non-summer months with first-term GPAs 
below 3.0 (column 1). Figure 1.2 shows that 20 percent of the 4–2 transfer students attended 
two-year colleges in the fall of the second year and 43 percent of them transferred within the first 
two years. The comparison group is non-4–2 transfer students with first-term GPAs below 3.0 
(column 2). Table 1.1 shows that the pre-transfer characteristics of the transfer and non-transfer 
group are very similar to each other but different from those with higher first-term GPAs, which 
justifies the necessity of the restriction. 
Among struggling and high achieving students in public four-year colleges in this state, 
women were more likely to engage in 4–2 transfer. In my sample, I find that women are 10 
percentage points more likely to transfer and 4–2 transfer students are up to five percentage 
                                                            
1 The results for using a lower GPA threshold (2.5) are similar. However, using the 3.0 GPA threshold provides 




points more likely to major in allied health in their first term at four-year colleges (Table 1.2). 
Since four-year credits in allied health are more transferable and the returns are higher than from 
other fields at community colleges, many women may see it an opportunity to transfer to a health 
related program in two-year institutions when facing academic difficulties in four-year schools. 
The rest of the student body primarily have undeclared or humanities majors in their first term. 
 Other than their proximity to a two-year college, struggling 4–2 transfer students had 
similar pre-transfer characteristics as struggling students who did not transfer, including racial 
composition, age at enrollment, high school and first-term GPA, credits earned, probability of 
living in a metropolitan area, and county-level characteristics.2 The average distance to the 
closest two-year college is 17 miles. Ten percent of the students are within 2 miles and 90 
percent are within 37 miles of a two-year college. 4-2 transfer students tend to live closer to a 
two-year college then non-transfer students. 
About 39 percent of struggling 4–2 transfer students eventually returned to a four-year 
institution. The corresponding figure is 55 percent among high achieving 4–2 transfer students. 
As mentioned before, some students attend two-year colleges in the summer to complement their 
four-year courses; therefore, a small proportion of the non-transfer students last attended a two-
year college.3  
Eventually, 14 percent of the struggling 4–2 transfer students earned a bachelor’s degree, 
which is approximately 21 percentage points less than the struggling students who did not 
transfer to a two-year college. Nonetheless, another 25% of the struggling 4–2 transfer students 
earned two-year college credentials, two thirds of these being associate degrees. Overall, the raw 
                                                            
2 I performed a standard t-test to compare the mean differences of each variable for students with less than and at 
least 3.0 first term GPA separately. None of the difference is statistically significant. 
3 Distance to the closest two-year college has a negative and statistically significant relationship with ever enrolling 





statistics indicate that a slightly higher proportion of struggling 4–2 transfer students than 
struggling non-transfer students completed any college credential. The postsecondary credential 
attainment rate was 39 percent for struggling 4–2 transfer students and 35 percent for struggling 
students who did not transfer. 
Regarding employment outcomes and work experience, struggling 4–2 transfer students 
were slightly more likely to be employed than struggling students that did not transfer. 
Comparing all groups, earnings were highest among high achieving students who did not 
transfer. 
Comparison with the National Sample 
To determine whether my sample resembles students first-time enrolled in four-year 
colleges, I compare the state sample to the national ELS data, which are nationally presentative 
of high school seniors in 2003. In comparison, the state sample contains slightly more minority 
students and students that live farther away from a two-year school. My sample also has lower 
performing students with a bachelor’s degree completion rate at least 20 percent below the 
national average.  
A second purpose for using the ELS data is their survey responses regarding transfer 
reasons. Table 1.3 reported the percentage of 4–2 transfer students responding “yes” to each 
question and the answers are not mutually exclusive. While family location is a major factor, a 
list of academic factors relating to programs, instruction, or schooling experience are also 






4. Empirical Strategy 
Basic ordinary least squares model  
To describe the relationship between 4–2 transfer and academic and labor market 
outcome for struggling four-year students, I first use a basic ordinary least squares (OLS) model: 
Yi = αi + βi transfer + Ωi X + ξi        (1)
  
where outcome Y at time t is a function of transfer status, transfer, indicating whether an 
individual engaged in 4–2 transfer or remained at the four-year level; a vector of prior transfer 
student characteristics, X, such as race, age at enrollment, first-term GPA, intent, and remedial 
and college-level credits earned in first term. X includes major fixed effects, initial four-year 
institution fixed effects, congressional district fixed effects,4 and county-level SES indicators.  
With equation (1), I explore both academic and labor market outcomes. For academic 
outcomes, I choose three binary outcomes that equal 1 if individuals earned at least a bachelor’s 
degree, a two-year college credential, or either type of postsecondary credential. Two-year 
college credentials include associate degrees and long-term and short-term certificates. I also 
look at enrollment in the fifth, sixth, and seventh years after entering college for the first time. 
Next, I look at three employment outcomes: whether the student was employed, actual earnings, 
and log earnings for the fifth to seventh years after first entering college. In addition to the 
covariates in equation (1), I also add the number of years worked to control for differences in 
students’ experiences, which positively correlate with future employment outcomes. 
It is possible that 4–2 transfer behavior varies with an individual’s major, initial 
institution, and cohort. For example, certain four-year colleges or departments may have 
historically higher rates of 4–2 transfer, or 4–2 transfer rates may be higher in more recent 
                                                            
4 Equation (1) is unable to control for county fixed effects because some counties only have one high school in the 




cohorts. Or some courses or subjects may be more commonly offered in nearby two-year 
colleges than others. To address these potential issues, I included cohort, academic major, and 
initial four-year institution fixed-effects to the equation. 
Addressing Self-selection Bias with an Instrumental Variable Approach.  
One of the major concerns in examining transfer behavior is self-selection bias. Students 
do not transfer randomly, and those who self-select into 4–2 transfer may be substantially 
different from those who do not, even conditional on the control variables in equation 1. For 
example, students with higher credits constraints may want to transfer given that community 
colleges offer more flexible schedules. Individuals with higher academic motivation may choose 
to transfer instead of simply dropping out of four-year colleges.  
One method to address this issue is to use an instrumental variable (IV) that is related to 
transfer status but has no direct relationship to the outcomes. One such example in the returns to 
education literature is proximity to college (Card, 1995; Long & Kurlaender, 2009). Assuming 
residence does not affect student outcomes, proximity to college lowers the cost of education, 
which induces students nearby a college to enroll. 
To adopt the IV in this context, I use the geodetic distance (which is the shortest curve 
along the surface of the earth) from high school attended to the closest two-year college as an IV 
for 4–2 transfer status.5 Since high school students tend to attend school in their own district, 
high school location is a good proxy for students’ home location. The rationale behind the IV is 
that struggling four-year students are more likely to engage in 4–2 transfer if there is a two-year 
college close to home.  
                                                            
5 Distance from high school attended is a better IV than distance from four-year college attended because students 
are more likely to move away for four-year education and less likely to do so for two-year college. To support this 
notion, I ran a placebo first stage regression of 4-2 transfer on distance from four-year institution. This distance is a 




To carry out the IV approach, the probability of 4–2 transfer is predicted using the IV 
Distance in the first stage: 
 = ∞i + δ i Distance + γ i X + ε i               (2) 
where the proximity to the closest two-year college, Distance, is calculated in miles. The actual 
4–2 transfer status in equation (1) is then substituted with the predicted values of the 4–2 transfer 
status from equation (2), 	 , as the second stage of the two-stage least squares process. 
There are several concerns with using distance as an IV in this study. Individuals who 
place a higher value on education may choose to live closer to a postsecondary campus (Card, 
1995; Long & Kurlaender, 2008; Rouse, 1995; Xu & Jaggers, 2014). The exclusion restriction 
assumption would also be violated if residence were directly correlated with academic or labor 
market outcomes. I further include county-level SES indicators in the regressions and conduct 
falsification tests to examine the correlation between distance and SES. I include rich 
geographical controls such as congressional district fixed effects, metropolitan area fixed effects, 
and county-level socioeconomic indicators in all of the analyses to control for any urban/rural 
and county-specific variations. 
 
5. Results 
The Validity of Distance as an Instrumental Variable 
The strength and validity of the IV. The premise of using distance as an IV is that 
students alter their 4–2 transfer behavior based on how far the closest two-year school is from 
their high school. Figure 1.3 presents a clear negative relationship between distance and the 




high school, the higher the 4–2 transfer rate. The relationship is much less clear among students 
with higher first term GPA.  
In addition, Row 1 of Table 1.4 presents the first stage results, which show that distance 
is a significant predictor of 4–2 transfer in the non-summer months for struggling students. The 
instrument is strong for struggling students with F-statistic of over 30. 6 Though the coefficients 
are the same for women (row 2) and men (row 3), the F-stat is much higher for women. This 
result is consistent with previous findings that women are more sensitive to commute distance 
and time since they on average take on a larger share of household responsibilities (Madden and 
White, 1980) or have access to the family car less often (Pickup, 1984).  
In comparison, row 4 shows that the predictive power of distance is very weak among 
high ability students and would make very imprecise IV estimation in the second stage. It is 
reasonable to believe that high ability students do not weigh the distance to a two-year college as 
much as struggling students in transfer decisions since they have a lower cost of completing a 
bachelor’s degree and are more likely to transfer for reasons related to academic excellence and 
prestige of the destination college 
Another concern about using distance as an IV is the issue of endogeneity. If the IV is 
correlated with the error term, this violates the exclusion restriction under the IV approach, 
which requires that the IV not affect outcomes other than through the treatment. As noted earlier, 
families who live closer to a two-year campus may be more highly motivated and may have 
better academic outcomes as a result. Figure 1.4 show the relationship between county-level SES 
indicators and proximity to two-year colleges. It does not seem that distance is correlated with 
the percentage of drinkers, smokers, students with free or reduced price lunch status, people 
                                                            
6 According to Stock, Wright, & Yogo (2002), the F-statistics should be at least 10 using one instrumental variable 
for one endogenous covariate to reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instrument is not a significant predictor 




without health insurance, or mothers younger than 20 in the county. The average household 
income and per capita income in the county also do not have strong relationships with distance.  
I also explore the correlation between the distance IV and academic outcomes in Row 6 
to 8 of Table 1.4. If students with higher educational motivation live closer to a two-year school, 
distance to a two-year college may also affect dropout rate or upward transfer from two-year to 
four-year colleges. Reassuringly, Table 1.4 indicates no statistically significant relationship 
between the IV and these outcomes. 
Academic Outcomes 
Ordinary least squares results. The analysis begins with an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation with equation (1) and three academic outcomes: the probability of completing 
a bachelor’s degree, a two-year college credential (associate degree or long- or short-term 
certificate), or any postsecondary credential. Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 1.5 present the 
baseline results with demographics characteristics, geographical controls, initial four-year 
college fixed effects, and county-level SES indicators. Columns 2, 4, and 6 are the results with 
the preferred specification as they include estimations with cohort and major fixed effects. The 
OLS estimates show that 4–2 transfer among students with less than a 3.0 GPA lowered an 
individual’s chance of earning a bachelor’s degree by 20 percent, but it increased the probability 
of earning a two-year college credential by 29 percent. Overall, students were 9 percent more 
likely to earn some kind of postsecondary credential after transferring to a two-year college. The 
results are robust to alternative specifications. 
Comparing IV and OLS estimates. To control for self-selection in the transfer process, 
I use the distance from high school attended to the closest two-year college to instrument for the 




(panel A), and the IV coefficients (Panel B) under the two-stage least squares analysis. The 
results remain robust to including additional controls.  
Panel A shows that the instrument does not correlate with any academic outcomes. 
Despite the positive coefficients, panel B does not show a significant effect of 4–2 transfer when 
using any outcomes. The high standard error and statistically insignificant results can indicate 
that the IV coefficients are imprecise. Compared with the OLS results, the IV result is more 
positive using bachelor’s degree outcomes and less positive using two-year credential outcomes. 
After controlling for all covariates, 4-2 transfer struggling students are 12% more likely to attain 
a two-year credential, statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval. The OLS results are 
also more consistent with previous findings (Hossler et al., 2012a; Kalogrides & Grodsky, 2011). 
One reason for the difference in results may be omitted variable bias. This would mean that the 
OLS model was unable to control for self-sorting that occurred in the transfer process even with 
rich controls and a carefully chosen comparison group. If less motivated students tend to transfer 
from four-year to two-year schools, the OLS results for bachelor’s degree attainment would be 
more negative. 
Academic results by gender. Earlier research on degree attainment and returns to 
education has shown that men and women often have different education outcomes. I therefore 
test the full specification and compare the results for men and women together as well as by 
gender, shown in Table 1.7. Panel A summarizes the IV and OLS estimates using both genders, 
which also appeared in columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6. 
Comparing panels B and C, the IV estimates for women and men are positive and 
statistically insignificant when using bachelor’s degree attainment as an outcome. It is highly 
likely that the specification did not obtain enough power to produce a statistically significant 




students were no less likely than struggling non-transfer students to earn a bachelor’s degree. 
Table 1.1 shows that struggling students have such a low four-year completion rate that the 
chances of earning a bachelor’s degree are similar regardless of transfer status. It is also plausible 
that two-year institutions have better prepared some students to return to a four-year college. 
Previous research has consistently reported that 4–2 transfer students found the two-year 
environment more encouraging to learning and to maintaining a work-life balance (Hill-Brown, 
1989; Kajstura & Keim, 1992; Kuznik, 1972; Losak, 1980; Vaala, 1991). In this case, some 
students may have been able to use their two-year education as a springboard to return to a four-
year college without compromising their chances of earning a bachelor’s degree.  
The statistically significant IV estimate for the two-year college credential is driven by 
the strong positive coefficient among women. The chances of earning an associate degree or 
long- or short-term certificate for struggling women and men were 29 percent and –5 percent 
respectively, with the former being statistically significant. The higher two-year college 
credential rate among women is likely due to the fact that more female 4–2 transfer students 
enroll in allied health or nursing programs than men. In fact, 50 percent of struggling female 4–2 
transfer students enrolled in health programs while only 36 percent of struggling male 4–2 
transfer students did so. These programs tend to be more structured, and the returns are 
extremely high; they may therefore have higher completion rates than other programs (Liu, 
Belfield, & Trimble, 2014). The second most popular field was art, humanities, and English, with 
about 15 percent of both genders.  
Column 5 shows that 4-2 female transfer students that live close to a two-year college are 
35% more likely to earn any higher education credential, including 4-year or 2-year credentials, 





Labor Market Results by Gender 
Gainful employment is an important accountability indicator for higher education. 
Unfortunately, the employment data in this dataset only allow for the following of students up to 
the seventh year after first enrollment at a four-year college (2005–06 cohort). 4-2 transfer 
students may just be finishing up their studies and entering the labor market in this period, so I 
am only able to explore the short-term returns to 4–2 transfer. Short-term employment outcomes 
are nevertheless helpful to students and policymakers in determining whether employers value 
struggling 4–2 transfer students differently from other struggling students. 
Table 1.8 pooled the labor market outcomes from five to seven years after initial college 
entry controlling for outcome year fixed effects and clustering the standard error at the student 
level. Panel A looks at the likelihood of being employed. Among those who are sensitive to the 
distance to two-year colleges, female 4-2 transfer students nearby a two-year college are 14% 
more likely to be employed than non-transfer students. Yet the employment rate of male 4-2 
transfer students is similar to non-transfer students.  
Panels B and C show the results using actual earning as the outcomes. All earnings are 
the yearly average of the quarterly earnings data adjusted to 2010 dollars. Panel B includes all 
individuals and all years regardless of the level of earnings. The coefficients are generally 
negative except for women in column 3 due to the high employment rate. Since the results in 
panel B are a combination of both employment and earnings effects, panel C looks only at those 
who have non-zero earnings in a particular year conditional on employment and found no 
statistically significant results.  
To impost a normal distribution for earnings, Panel D uses log earnings instead of actual 
earnings. Among struggling students nearby two-year colleges, 4-2 transfer students seem to earn 




with table 1.1 showing that 4-2 transfer students tend to stay in school longer, while in contrast, 
many non-transfer students enter the labor market. Even after controlling for years of experience, 
the earning lost may still be more severe among 4-2 transfer students.  
IV variation: Who is affected by the IV?  
The IV approach provides causal estimates only for the sample that is sensitive to the IV; 
this is known as the local average treatment effect (LATE). To understand the external validity 
of the IV, it is important to understand who is in this sample and where the variation comes from.  
Beginning four-year students have four possible education statuses: 4–2 transfer, lateral 
transfer to another four-year institution, continued enrollment at the initial institution, and 
dropping out completely from postsecondary education. If the distance to the closest two-year 
college induces students who started at a four-year institution to transfer to a two-year college, 
one would expect it to have a negative relationship with 4–2 transfer and a positive relationship 
with lateral transfer status. Panel B of Table 1.4 is consistent with this theory. 
I next look at 4–2 transfer and lateral transfer status as a function of both distances to 
two-year colleges and to four-year institutions. Table 1.9 confirms that the variations of the IV 
mainly come from students who intended to transfer.  
Proximity to the closest two-year college is positively related to 4–2 transfer and 
negatively correlated with lateral transfer. The effect of the distance to four-year institutions is 
the opposite. That implies that proximity to two-year colleges induced students who would 
otherwise have transferred to another four-year college to transfer to a two-year college instead. 
A possible explanation is that when students are overmatched academically or financially, they 
seek lower costs or a less demanding academic environment. Proximity to a two-year college 




In sum, the LATE estimates are based on the variation among students who were 
sensitive to the distance to a two-year college and students who had the intention to transfer 
within the first three years of four-year enrollment. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To investigate whether transferring to a two-year college is a good option for four-year 
students who are struggling academically, I used a state administrative dataset in combination 
with proximity to the closest two-year college from a student’s high school as an IV for 4–2 
transfer status. Restricting my sample to four-year students with less than a 3.0 GPA in the first 
term, I found that 4–2 transfer students who live close to a two-year college were more likely 
than non-transfer students to complete a two-year college credential (including associate degrees 
and long- and short-term certificates). These findings are robust even after adding controls for 
SES indicators and cohorts, initial four-year institution, and major fixed effects. After correcting 
for selection bias, the IV results also show that struggling 4–2 transfer students were no less 
likely than struggling non-transfer students to earn a bachelor’s degree.  
A second observation is that the gains were heterogeneous across gender. It seems that 
only women benefitted from 4–2 transfer. In particular, the gains in two-year college credentials 
favored women, due to the fact that they tended to be enrolled in nursing or health care 
programs, which have more structured programs and higher completion rates than other 
programs. The IV estimates show no academic gains among men. 
These academic gains merit attention from policymakers and administrators and 
proponents of the college completion agenda. The raw statistics show that the chances of 




GPA in their first semester. Facilitating the transfer process to a two-year college may thus give 
struggling students a better chance of completing a college credential, which in turn may make 
them more competitive in the labor market.  
The short-term employment outcomes indicate that the employers are more likely to hire 
female transfer students who live close to a two-year college perhaps due to their success in 
completing college. Due to the longer period of time being enrolled in school, transfer students 
accumulate less working experience and this is reflected in their lower log earnings conditional 
on employment. Though this study does not examine the medium and long-term returns for 4–2 
transfer students, research on the returns to two-year education has shown strong gains for two-
year college credentials and for even as little as one year of credits, with especially large gains in 
technical fields (Bahr, 2014; Dadgar & Weiss, 2012; Jacobson, LaLonde, & Sullivan, 2005; 
Jepsen, Troske, & Coomes, 2014; Liu et al., 2014; Marcotte, Bailey, Borkoski, & Kienzl, 2005; 
Xu & Trimble, 2015). 
The current study has several limitations, and future research should extend the 4–2 
transfer literature in three ways. First, though short-term outcome findings are helpful, longer-
term outcomes are important to properly evaluate the value of 4–2 transfer. That would require 
longer follow-up for attainment and employment data. Second, a national causal study would 
provide reliable 4–2 transfer information beyond this one state. Third, the IV approach only 
provides the local average treatment effects of 4–2 transfer. The ability to generalize these 
results depends on the heterogeneity of the effects across all 4–2 transfer students, which is 
impossible to test based on the small sample size.  
Despite these limitations, this is one of the first causal studies that investigate the 
academic and employment outcomes of 4–2 transfer students. These findings are especially 




which would no doubt encourage 4–2 transfer. If a substantial percentage of students who drop 
out of a four-year college can successfully complete a postsecondary credential at a two-year 
college, policies that facilitate the 4–2 transfer process would move states much closer to 
meeting their college completion goals. 
This study also prompts policymakers and administrators to rethink the role of four-year 
versus two-year education as well as the two in combination. The path to higher education 
credentials is now more complex than ever. This study only looks at 4–2 transfer. In the future, 
policymakers and college administrators should consider evaluating various transfer paths and 
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Figure 1.2: Timing for 4–2 Transfer (Fall 2005–06 , 2006–07, and 2007–08 Entering 



































Figure 1.4: High School County Characteristics by Distance With Less Than a 3.0 First-
Term GPA 
 
Panel A: County Annual Income 
 
 







Table 1.1: Data Summary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National 4–2 Transfer  4-Year Only 4–2 Transfer 4-Year Only 
Average < 3.0 GPA < 3.0 GPA ≥ 3.0 GPA ≥ 3.0 GPA 
Observations 5,225 2,102 4,297 1,313 4,681 
Demographic characteristics  
Female 55% 55% 48% 68% 58% 
White 73% 67% 63% 70% 76% 
Black  13% 26% 30% 23% 17% 
Hispanic  8% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Other races 5% 3% 3% 4% 3% 
Age at enrollment 19 19 19 19 19 
Miles to the closest two-year college 12 15 18 15 17 
Entering cohort: 2005–06 92% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Entering cohort: 2005–06 3% 39% 36% 36% 36% 
Entering cohort: 2006–07 0% 33% 33% 32% 32% 
Entering cohort: 2007–08 0% 29% 32% 32% 32% 
High school GPA 2.98 2.95 2.97 3.22 3.47 
GPA term 1 2.86 2.22 2.27 3.36 3.47 
GPA year 1 . 2.30 2.34 3.14 3.33 
Credits earned year 1 . 20 21 24 27 
Last attended a four-year university . 39% 98% 55% 99% 
Lives in a metropolitan area . 62% 63% 63% 66% 
County-level characteristics  
Household income . $32,620 $31,935 $32,297 $32,220 
Percentage mothers with college degree . 40% 39% 40% 40% 
Percentage without insurance . 18% 18% 18% 18% 
Percentage smokers/ drinkers . 23% 23% 23% 23% 
Percentage Black in school district . 2% 2% 1% 2% 
Percentage Hispanic in school district . 32% 30% 32% 28% 
Percentage other races in school district . 6% 5% 5% 5% 
Percentage receiving free/reduced lunch  . 56% 57% 57% 56% 
Still enrolled in the 5th year  . 50% 45% 57% 53% 
Still enrolled in the 6th year  . 38% 27% 41% 30% 
Still enrolled in the 7th year  . 23% 12% 20% 13% 
Highest degree earned in 2013  
Certificate  . 9% 0% 3% 0% 
Associate degree  . 16% 0% 26% 0% 
Any two-year credentials 11%     
Bachelor’s degree 65% 14% 35% 26% 67% 
Employed in the 5th year . 91% 89% 90% 88% 
Employed in the 6th year . 90% 87% 89% 86% 
Employed in the 7th year . 87% 82% 88% 83% 
Earnings in the 5th year   . $16,036 $16,520 $17,832 $19,657 
Percentage missing or $0 earnings (all)  . 36% 42% 39% 43% 
Earnings in the 6th year . $18,685 $19,034 $21,395 $23,482 
Percentage missing or $0 earnings  
(2005–07 & 2006–07 cohorts) 
. 7% 10% 8% 11% 
Earnings in the 7th year . $19,696 $21,040 $22,218 $25,628 
Percentage missing or $0 earnings  
(2005–06 cohort) 








Table 1.2: Major Fields declared in the First Term 
4-2 transfer Exclusive 4yr 4-2 transfer Exclusive 4yr 
All <3.0 GPA <3.0 GPA >=3.0 GPA >=3.0 GPA Male Female 
Other fields or undeclared 41% 38% 39% 48% 41% 41% 40% 
Art, humanities, and english 14% 14% 15% 13% 12% 14% 14% 
Business & marketing 9% 9% 10% 6% 9% 11% 8% 
Allied health 8% 12% 7% 10% 8% 3% 13% 
        
Education and child care 8% 7% 8% 7% 7% 5% 9% 
Mathematics and Sciences 7% 7% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 
Social & behavioral Sciences 5% 5% 5% 4% 6% 4% 6% 
Engineering and architecture 4% 3% 4% 2% 4% 7% 1% 
        
Computer and Information Sciences 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 4% 0% 
Agriculture and natural resources 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 1% 
Protective services 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
        
Engineering/science technologies 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Transportation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 









Table 1.3: Reason for Transfer with ELS Data (Not mutually exclusive) 
 
Percentage Reasons for Transfer 
39% Because family moved 
38% For programs/offerings 
37% Due to dissatisfaction with school 
31% For quality of instruction 
29% For financial reasons 
27% For another reason 
24% Because of location 
19% Due to academic problems 
14% Due to scheduling problems 
13% Due to family responsibilities 
9% Due to personal health reasons 
7% Because did not feel safe at other school 
6% Because finished classes 
6% Because of a traumatic experience 
3% Because completed degree or certificate 








Table 1.4: The Role of Distance Per Mile on Transfer Status and Other Outcomes (2005-06, 2006–07, 
and 2007–08 Cohort) 
 




stat Sample Observations R2 
(1) 4–2 Transfer  –0.004*** [0.001] 38.94 Starting 4yr, gpa<3.0 6,399 0.059 
(2) 4–2 Transfer (Women)  –0.004*** [0.001] 27.64 Starting 4yr, gpa<3.0,  3,206 0.076 
(3) 4–2 Transfer (Men) –0.004*** [0.001] 19.34 Starting 4yr, gpa<3.0,  3,193 0.050 
(4) 4–2 Transfer  –0.002*** [0.001] 10.55 Starting 4yr, gpa ≥ 3.0 5994 0.067 
(5) Dropout completely 0.001 [0.001] 1.23 Starting 4yr, gpa<3.0 6,399 0.192 
(6) Dropout completely –0.000 [0.001] 0.48 Starting 4yr, gpa ≥ 3.0 6,399 0.254 
(7) Ever upward transfer 0.000 [0.001] 11.94 Starting 2yr 11,385 0.115 
(8) Ever lateral transfer 0.006*** [0.001] 97 Starting 4yr, gpa<3.0 6,399 0.082 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the high school level are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from 
fall 2005 to summer 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, who are residents of the state, and who are enrolled full-
time and not co-enrolled in another two-year college in the first term. Covariates in all regressions include demographic characteristics 
(gender, race, age at enrollment, experience, experience square), geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, dummy for being in 
the metropolitan areas), initial four-year controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, intent, initial four-year schools fixed effect), and 
county level SES indicators (percentage of drinkers/smoker, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with college 
degree, White/Asian/Black/Hispanic in school district, free or reduced price lunch status), and cohort and major fixed effects. 














Table 1.5: Academic Results From OLS With 2005–06 to 2007–08 Cohorts With Less Than a 3.0 First-
Term GPA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls
Bachelor’s Degree 
Two-Year College 
Credential Any Credential 
4–2 Transfer -0.200*** -0.201*** 0.289*** 0.292*** 0.088*** 0.091***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.018] 
Demographic characteristics X X X X X X 
County-level indicators X X X X X X 
Fixed effects included:       
Initial four-year schools X X X X X X 
Congressional district  X X X X X X 
Cohort  X  X  X 
Majors  X  X  X 
Observations 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 
R-squared 0.038 0.239 0.212 0.241 0.007 0.198 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the high-school level are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year 
students from fall 2005 to summer 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, are residents of the state with a 
first-term GPA below 3.0, and are enrolled full-time and not co-enrolled in another two-year college in the first term; covariates in 
the baseline regression include student characteristics (gender, race, first-term GPA and credits earned), geographic controls (living 
in metropolitan area average household income), county-level SES indicators (percent mothers with college degree, percentage 
without health insurance, percentage smokers or drinkers, percentage of minority in school district, and percentage receiving 
free/reduced price lunch in school district), congressional district fixed effects), and initial four-year schools fixed effects; columns 2, 
4, and 6 include all covariates in the baseline regression with additional cohort and major fixed effects. 








Table 1.6: Academic Results From IV (2005–06, 2006–07, and 2007–08 Cohorts With Less 
Than a 3.0 First-Term GPA) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






A. Reduced Form       
Miles to closest two-year –0.0002 –0.0002 –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0006 –0.0007 
 [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.005] [0.0005] 
Observations 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 
R-squared 0.195 0.202 0.030 0.037 0.184 0.191 
B. IV Coefficients       
4–2 Transfer 0.055 0.060 0.104 0.122* 0.160 0.182 
[0.142] [0.137] [0.077] [0.074] [0.139] [0.137] 
Observations 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 
R-squared 0.172 0.177 0.152 0.172 0.187 0.191 
       
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the high school level are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-
year students from fall 2005 to summer 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, who are 
residents of the state with first-term GPAs below 3.0, and are enrolled full-time and not co-enrolled in another two-year 
college in the first term; covariates in the baseline regression include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age 
at enrollment), geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial 
four-year controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES 
indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with college 
degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free or reduced price lunch status); 
columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 include all covariates in the baseline regression with additional cohort and major fixed effects. 




Table 1.7: Academic Results by Gender Using Preferred Specification (2005–06, 
2006–07, and 2007–08 Cohorts With Less Than a 3.0 First-Term GPA)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
Bachelor’s Degree 
Two-Year College 
Credential Any Credential 
A. All 
4–2 Transfer 0.060 -0.201*** 0.122* 0.292*** 0.182 0.091*** 
[0.137] [0.012] [0.074] [0.016] [0.137] [0.018] 
       
Observations 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399 
R-squared 0.177 0.239 0.172 0.241 0.191 0.198 
       
B. Women 
4–2 Transfer 0.056 -0.220*** 0.298** 0.314*** 0.353* 0.094*** 
[0.189] [0.014] [0.119] [0.019] [0.207] [0.022] 
       
Observations 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 
R-squared 0.179 0.250 0.268 0.269 0.136 0.191 
       
C. Men 
4–2 Transfer 0.078 -0.179*** -0.046 0.265*** 0.031 0.086*** 
[0.179] [0.018] [0.127] [0.020] [0.182] [0.025] 
       
Observations 3,193 3,193 3,193 3,193 3,193 3,193 
R-squared 0.186 0.242   0.217 0.212 0.214 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the high school level are shown in brackets; sample includes all 
beginning four-year students from fall 2005 to summer 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in 
the public sector, who are residents of the state with first-term GPAs below 3.0, and are enrolled full-
time and not co-enrolled in another two-year college in the first term; covariates in the above regressions 
include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), geographic controls 
(congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year controls 
(first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES 
indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, 
mothers with college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free 
or reduced price lunch status), and cohort and major fixed effects. 






Table 1.8: Pooled Earnings Results by Gender With Preferred Specification (2005–06, 
2006–07, and 2007–08 Cohorts With Less Than a 3.0 First-Term GPA)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
All Women Men 
 
A. Employability 
4–2 Transfer 0.025 0.000 0.139* -0.004 -0.072 0.003 
[0.059] [0.005] [0.079] [0.007] [0.088] [0.007] 
Observations 23,913 23,913 11,946 11,946 11,967 11,967 
R-squared 0.362 0.363 0.349 0.369 0.355 0.360 
 
B. Actual earnings (Missing as $0) 
4–2 Transfer -3,311 -311 1,559 -311 -8,268 -184 
[3,239] [279] [3,137] [332] [5,793] [462] 
Observations 23,913 23,913 11,946 11,946 11,967 11,967 
R-squared 0.139 0.147 0.155 0.160 0.095 0.141 
C. Actual earnings Conditional on Employment 
4–2 Transfer -5,131 -452 -774 -342 -8,876 -379 
[3,711] [339] [3,522] [398] [6,512] [563] 
Observations 17,700 17,700 8,825 8,825 8,875 8,875 
R-squared 0.098 0.120 0.126 0.126 0.064 0.117 
       
D. Log earnings Conditional on Employment 
4–2 Transfer -0.557** -0.026 -0.266 -0.001 -0.743* -0.017 
[0.280] [0.026] [0.331] [0.035] [0.435] [0.037] 
Observations 17,700 17,700 8,825 8,825 8,875 8,875 
R-squared 0.035 0.072 0.068 0.078 0.005 0.079 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the student level are shown in brackets; regression of the 4th to 7th are pooled 
together with additional 5th, 6th, and 7th year dummies; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to summer 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, who are residents of the state with first-
term GPAs below 3.0, and are enrolled full-time and not co-enrolled in another two-year college in the first term; 
Covariates in the above regressions include demographic characteristics (gender, race, age at enrollment), geographic 
controls (congressional district fixed effects, dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year controls (first 
term GPA, first term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effect), and county level SES indicators (percentage 
of drinkers/smoker, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with college degree, 
Whites/Asian/Black/Hispanic in school district, free or reduced price lunch status), cohort and major fixed effects, 
experience, experience squared, and enrollment in the year of the employment outcome. 





Table 1.9: Relationships Between Transfer Status and Distance to Two-Year and 
Four-Year Colleges With Less Than a 3.0 First-Term GPA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
4–2        
Transfer 






Distance to two-year college -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Distance to four-year college 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 6,390 6,390 6,390 6,390 
R-squared 0.016 0.057 0.006 0.055 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the high school level are shown in brackets; sample includes 
all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 to summer 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree 
in the public sector, who are residents of the state with first-term GPAs below 3.0, and are enrolled 
full-time and not co-enrolled in another two-year college in the first term; covariates in the above  
regressions include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), geographic 
controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-
year controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and 
county-level SES indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, 
household income, mothers with college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in 
the school district, free or reduced price lunch status), and cohort and major fixed effects. 













Goodbye to Summer Vacation? The Effects of Summer Enrollment 




The United States now lags behind other nations in terms of college attainment. Between 
1990 and today, the U.S. dropped from first to twelfth in the world ranking for four-year degree 
attainment among 25- to 34-year-olds (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2015). In 2013, the six-year bachelor’s degree graduation rate for first-
time, full-time undergraduate students who started college in fall 2007 was only 59 percent. 
Meanwhile, the strongly positive returns to higher education and the changing skill demands in 
the labor market have made the attainment of higher education a near necessity for acquiring a 
middle-class job (Carnevale, Smith, & Strohl, 2010; Levy & Murnane, 2012). As a result, 
policymakers and others are increasingly looking to graduate more individuals from college. In 
particular, the use of summer courses as a means to increase college completion rates has 
become attractive. 
While summer has traditionally been a time of rest or employment, colleges and the 
media have increasingly encouraged students to shorten their vacations and other undertakings 
and engage in learning activities that might benefit them more in the long-term.7 Despite the rich 
K-12 literature on summer learning loss, we know close to nothing about the effect of a long 






that the biggest leak in the college “pipeline” among students enrolled in a four-year college 
occurs after the summers. On average, the withdrawal rate among four-year college students who 
began college for the first time in 2004 is 6 percent each for the first summer and second summer 
after initial enrollment. Those rates double for nonselective institutions and among students with 
low socioeconomic status (SES). These disturbing statistics suggest the need for interventions 
designed to prevent after-summer enrollment loss. 
Recently, more students are becoming aware of the potential benefit of summer 
coursework. According to ELS data, one in five four-year students enrolled in their first summer 
after initial college enrollment, and the percentage of students who did so peaks in the third 
summer. The effect of summer enrollment has been frequently discussed in the K-12 literature; 
however, very few studies have investigated the effect of summer enrollment in higher education 
settings. The voluntary nature of summer enrollment in college creates difficulty in investigating 
its effects on student outcomes, as summer enrollees are more likely to be highly motivated and 
may have better academic outcomes regardless of their summer attendance status.  
This paper uses a state administrative dataset to exploit the exogenous variation in 
proximity to the closest four-year institution to examine the effect of summer enrollment on 
subsequent achievement. I find that for students who are sensitive to the proximity to four-year 
colleges, enrolling in summer credits increased retention and credits accumulated in the 
following fall without comprising grades. I also find positive gains in bachelor’s degree 
completion rates, employment, and earnings especially for women. 
The current paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, despite the 
prevalence of summer enrollment and its potential benefits, very few studies have provided 




The current paper not only examines descriptively the characteristics of summer enrollees and 
non-summer enrollees, it provides one of the first causal evidences on the impact of summer 
enrollment on college enrollment, grades, and degree attainment. 
Second, I isolate the effect of summer enrollment by using the distance from a four-year 
college as an instrumental variable (IV) for enrolling in summer coursework. Attewell et al.’s 
(2012) study intended to control for selection bias using a propensity score matching strategy, 
but such an approach may not be able to isolate the causal effect of summer enrollment. Summer 
enrollees may have similar pretreatment characteristics as other students that engage in activities 
that also increase academic momentum. I, therefore, exploit variation in proximity to a four-year 
college as an instrument, which isolates summer enrollment with no effect on enrollment patterns 
that affect college outcomes. 
Third, I suggest and examine three potential mechanisms through which summer 
enrollment may affect future enrollment patterns, grade point average, and bachelor’s degree 
completion. By estimating the impact of summer enrollment on grades in the following academic 
year, I examine whether summer enrollment may lead to learning gains. In addition, I explore the 
academic momentum hypothesis by examining enrollment patterns after summer enrollment. I 
also investigate whether summer enrollment can reduce time to degree completion. 
Finally, previous studies using distance as an instrument have provided limited validity 
checks on the relationship between residence and SES (Carneiro, Meghir, & Parey, 2011; 
Carneiro & Heckman, 2002; Card 1995; Dee, 2004; Kane & Rouse, 1995; Long & Kurlaender, 
2009; Xu & Jaggars, 2013). My analysis includes extensive correlation tests beyond the 
association between distance from a four-year institution and SES: these include tests concerning 




enrollment patterns. The findings show that while the distance from a four-year institution can be 
related to many variables, this does not invalidate the IV used in the paper.  
Section 2 of this paper reviews relevant literature on the effect of summer vacation and 
summer enrollment at the K-12 level and discusses how summer enrollment may influence 
college students. Section 3 presents the various mechanisms by which summer enrollment may 
impact academic and labor market outcomes. It further specifies the empirical method used for 
the analysis. Section 4 describes the data source and provides a statistical summary of the 
sample. Section 5 reports the findings, and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
For a century, K-12 researchers have documented the “summer slide,” or summer 
learning loss, among students after a long summer break. A review of 39 studies found that 
typical learning loss is equivalent to approximately one month’s worth of skills or knowledge 
acquired in math and language arts combined (Cooper, Nye, Charlton, Lindsay, & Greathouse, 
1996). The authors found that summer loss is much more profound in subjects that involve the 
acquisition of knowledge, such as spelling and mathematics, than for other subjects or skill areas 
that are more conceptually based, such as reading. Furthermore, Alexander, Entwisle, and Olson 
(2007) showed that summer learning loss is cumulative over the course of multiple years and that 
cumulative learning loss widens the achievement gap by family socioeconomic (SES) level over 
time. 
Despite the lack of summer slide literature at the college level, it is highly likely that 




typically longer than three months, which is longer than the summer break for students at the K-
12 level. Without compulsory enrollment in the summer, learning loss may be higher among 
college students who do not engage in learning-based activities in the summer. 
The net learning loss in various subject areas at the K-12 level seems to be dependent on 
students’ SES but not on students’ gender, ethnicity, or IQ. High-SES students tend to 
experience less learning loss; indeed, in some cases, high-SES students experience learning 
gains, especially in reading, compared to low-SES students (Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 
2001; Cooper et al., 1996). The difference in learning loss has been attributed to differences in 
opportunities to access and read books over the summer (Alexander et al., 2001). 
Similar to results found in K-12 settings, researchers have found strong and consistent 
achievement gaps in higher education between higher and lower SES students (Bailey & 
Dynarski, 2011; Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009). It is therefore plausible that summer 
learning loss disproportionally affects low-SES college students. 
A parallel branch of literature addresses another concern of summer vacation, “summer 
melt,” which refers to the high percentage of students (10–40 percent) who fail to matriculate at 
the college they have been accepted to after the summer following their high school graduation 
(Castleman & Page, 2014; Daugherty, 2012; Matthews, Schooley, & Vosler, 2011). In particular, 
low-SES students are more susceptible to summer melt (Roderick, Nagaoka, Coca, & Moeller, 
2008). In one study, Arnold, Fleming, DeAnda, Castleman, and Wartman (2009) found that up to 
one-third of low-income students who had been accepted to and paid deposits to college decided 
not to enroll at all. 
The above studies hypothesized that low-income students’ plans are prone to change over 




enrollment, including completing paperwork and securing additional funding to meet the gap 
between financial aid and college cost. Without access to high-quality support and guidance, 
students are more likely to give up on college. Similarly, college students face many of these 
same hurdles in the summers after initial enrollment, which can often affect students’ plans of 
reenrolling after summer breaks. 
Research in behavioral economics suggests that net short-term costs weigh more heavily 
on an individual’s decision-making process, even if the alternative investment would be more 
beneficial in the long term (Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008; Pallais, 
2009). The returns to a four-year degree are much higher than those of a high school diploma, 
but students may weigh their short-term gains more heavily and decide to leave school after 
earning a full-time salary over the summer. In interviews with 600 young adults who were 22 to 
30 years old, Johnson and Rochkind (2009) found that full-time employment is a major reason 
for not returning to college once having left for the summer. The tuition bills students receive 
over the summer for the following term may also trigger more financial anxiety over returning to 
school in the fall. 
Summer bridge programs intending to combat the summer melt phenomenon aim to 
assist students in their transition from high school graduates to college students. These programs 
typically involve summer counseling and primarily target minority and low-SES students, who 
are most likely to change their plans after having accepted a college offer (Roderick et al., 2008). 
The literature on the efficacy of summer bridge programs is inconclusive, however. While one 
randomized control study on eight developmental summer bridge programs in Texas found no 
achievement effect on program participants (Barnett, Bork, Mayer, Pretlow, Wathington, & 




students randomly assigned to receive proactive outreach from high school counselors 
addressing financial and information barriers (Castleman, Arnold, & Wartman, 2012; Castleman, 
Page, & Schooley, 2014). 
At the college level, a few studies have found positive outcomes among activities that are 
aimed at generating “academic momentum” in college. One descriptive study found a strong 
correlation between summer enrollment and credit accumulation (McCormick & Carroll, 1999); 
another found a strong correlation between summer enrollment and degree completion 
(Adelman, 2006). Using a propensity score matching technique, Attewell, Heil, and Reisel 
(2012) also found that enrollment in college coursework in the summer after freshman year is 
associated with 7–16 percentage points higher bachelor’s degree completion rate. 
Together the summer bridge program literature and academic momentum literature 
suggest that participation in summer study may improve college students’ academic outcomes. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework: 
Based on the literature and common convention, there are four mechanisms by which 
enrollment in the summer can influence academic and labor market outcomes. 
Summer Learning Effect 
First, by remaining enrolled in coursework during the summer, students may be less 
prone to lose knowledge or skills acquired from the previous term and thus may have a higher 
GPA in the fall. Despite the lack of evidence for this at the college level, the evidence on K-12 
summer school interventions appears positive if somewhat murky due to variation in program 




participating in summer programs is between zero to a quarter of a standard deviation, on 
average, depending on the empirical rigor and program content of the studies (Cooper, Charlton, 
Valentine, Muhlenbruck, & Borman, 2000; Kim & Quinn, 2013; Lauer, Akia, Wilkerson, 
Apthorp, Snow, & Matin-Glenn, 2006). The most rigorous meta-analysis in summer school 
interventions (Kim & Quinn, 2013) reviewed 41 studies on summer reading programs that 
employed only experimental and quasi-experimental designs. The analysis showed that the 
average gain in GPA as a result of participating in a summer reading program is one-tenth of a 
standard deviation—the approximate mid-point of Cooper et al. (2000), Kim & Quinn (2013), 
and Lauer et al. (2006)—and the benefit is statistically larger for low-income students. 
Academic Momentum Effect 
Second, some evidence has been found that activities that increase academic momentum 
such as summer enrollment and full-time enrollment in the first college term can increase 
academic intensity (i.e., the number of credits enrolled in per term or per year) and improve 
college outcomes (Adelman, 1999, 2006; Attewell et al., 2012; Martin, Wilson, Liem, & Ginns, 
2013). According to the academic momentum theory, early enrollment patterns may strongly 
influence students’ subsequent progress and the likelihood of completion (Tinto, 1987; Wittrock, 
1974). Activities that increase academic momentum such as enrollment in summer courses, 
immediate entry into college after high school graduation, and full-time enrollment in the first 
term can improve the rate of college completion. Furthermore, according to these studies, 
academic intensity is more likely to influence the rate of college completion than 




Earlier Graduation/Reduced Cost Effect  
The third mechanism relates to the cost of college and length of time to graduation 
(Tutors, 2015; Nelson, 2009). Taking advantage of the summer term can allow students to catch 
up on coursework needed to graduate on time or to take remediation courses. In addition, 
summer courses often have smaller class sizes, allowing each student more individualized 
attention and potentially higher learning gains. Finally, students may have the flexibility to take 
courses at a college closer to home with the option of transferring the credits later. As a result, 
summer enrollees are able to reduce the overall cost of their education by living at home over the 
summer. 
Earnings Effect  
The final mechanism relates to students’ ability to accumulate working experience while 
enrolled in college. Since individuals with more working experience tend to earn more, summer 
enrollment may influences the hours worked during college and affect earnings after graduation 
in three ways. First, to offset the gap between financial aid and the cost of college, students may 
choose either to take out more student loans or to increase the number of hours worked during 
the academic year. If a student opts to work more hours over the course of the traditional 
academic year, the increased experience may positively affect future earnings by increasing 
students’ work experience. Second, students who do not enroll in summer courses may work 
more because they have more time off. As a result, these two effects may offset each other. 
Finally, if summer enrollees have a higher completion rate than non-summer enrollees, they will 




4. Data and Summary Statistics 
Data Description 
The administrative data analyzed in this paper are from a higher education system in an 
anonymous southern state and include 16,000 bachelor’s degree-seeking students who first 
enrolled in the fall of 2005, 2006, and 2007. The analysis focuses on students who were residents 
of the state, intending to seek bachelor’s degrees, and who had transcript records and had earned 
credits in their first term. Based on these criteria, the final sample analyzed in this paper contains 
approximately 14,000 students followed until fall of 2013. 
The student dataset contains demographic information such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, 
county, and high school code. Also included for each student is course-level information such as 
course names, grades earned, credits attempted, and credits earned for all college courses taken 
within the state’s two- and four-year public systems, and information on major and degree 
attainment. Finally, the dataset includes high school transcripts which list courses taken, 
admission test scores, and each student’s intentions for education after high school. 
To explore returns to education, earnings data is merged from the Unemployment 
Insurance records, which include quarterly earnings adjusted to 2010 dollars and industry codes. 
I also include county-level SES indicators at the time of college enrollment from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and the state’s department of health. These indicators include county-level 
household income, per capita income, percentage of drinkers or smokers, proportion of mothers 
under 20 years old, percentage of residents without health insurance, and percentage of students 




Summer Enrollment Statistics 
I identify summer enrollment in terms of the credits enrolled in during summer. 
Internship credits are not counted as summer credits to isolate the effect of summer enrollment at 
a four-year college from other out-of-school activities. Over half of the students enrolled in at 
least one summer credit within five years of enrolling in college for the first time. Figure 2.1 
displays the number of summer credits enrolled in among students who have enrolled in at least 
one credit for each particular summer. Summer credits enrolled in peaks at three credits and then 
again at six credits, indicating that summer enrollees typically take one to two courses during the 
summer. 
Figure 2.2 presents descriptive data on the percentage of students ever enrolled in each 
summer and the average summer credits enrolled in by year. The dotted bars show that 12 
percent of the students in the sample took any summer course in the summer after their first year 
at college. The percentage increases and peaks at the third summer at 26 percent. The dotted line 
indicates that the number of credits enrolled in by summer enrollees was about five credits. The 
solid bars and line show similar trends for college-level (i.e., non-remedial) courses, which may 
suggest that summer enrollees tended to take remedial courses in the first couple summers and 
took more advanced courses later on. 
Figure 2.3 further breaks down the statistics by students’ majors and CIP codes. The dark 
bars show that over 50 percent of the students majoring in math & science and engineering 
sciences enrolled in at least one summer course. In education & childcare, allied health, business 
& marketing, and transportation majors, close to 50 percent of the students did so. The light bars 




science majors attempted approximately six credits, on average, while business & marketing 
majors and information science majors enrolled in only three summer credits, on average. 
Data Summary 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive summary of the sample in comparison to the national 
sample. Column 1 displays statistics from the national Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) 
sample, who were first-time enrolled in four–year colleges in 2004. 8Compared to the BPS data, 
my sample contains slightly more female, minority, and older students.  Students in this state 
also tend to have lower credits earned, lower GPAs in the first year, and lower bachelor’s degree 
completion rates.  
Summer enrollees are defined as individuals that have ever enrolled in a four-year college 
in the summer. Although this excludes students who enrolled in summer courses exclusively at 
two-year colleges, the effect of this phenomenon is minor because only one in every ten students 
enrolled in the summer at two-year colleges, with around one credit of enrollment on average. 
The demographic characteristics of summer enrollees and non-summer enrollees look 
similar, and most mean differences are not statistically significant. The raw means, however, 
show that female and White students were slightly more likely to enroll in the summer, and that 
summer enrollees tended to live closer to a four-year institution. The county-level characteristics 
look almost identical among the two groups. 
On average, summer enrollees accumulated 11.4 summer credits; 10.3 of those credits 
were from four-year colleges. Nine percent of their total credits earned were earned during the 
summer. Thirteen percent of the non-summer enrollees took at least one course at a two-year 
                                                            
8 All the survey data from the BPS are weighted with the variable WTB000 to represent students who were study respondents when they first 




college over summer, yet the average number of credits enrolled in was very small over the five 
years. 
Regarding academic ability, students who took classes in the summer were more likely 
than summer non-enrollees to have a higher grade point average (GPA) in high school and 
during the first year of college. Summer enrollees also had heavier course loads in the first year 
and higher credits earned by the junior and senior years in college than non-summer enrollees. 
Finally, summer enrollees also exhibited higher retention and completion rates. 
 
5. Empirical Methods 
Ordinary Least Squares Model 
To examine the impact of summer enrollment empirically, I first employ a basic ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model to explore the relationship between summer credits enrolled in and 
subsequent academic outcomes: 
	 	           (1) 
At the student level,  is the outcome for individual  post-treatment, such as 
enrollment, credits earned, grades, bachelor’s degree attainment, employment rate, or log 
earnings. , the variable of interest, is the difference in academic outcomes attributable per 
credit to summer enrollment. I chose credits enrolled instead of a dummy variable of ever 
enrolling in a summer course to take into account variation in the number of summer credits 




more summer credits than for those who took fewer summer courses. Using summer credits 
enrolled eliminates that problem. 
 is a set of demographic variables measured before the first summer after initial college 
enrollment, including age, race/ethnicity, gender, high school graduation year, resident tuition 
status, a dummy variable for living in the metropolitan area, initial college fixed effects, cohort 
fixed effects, major fixed effects, congressional district fixed effects, and a vector of county-level 
SES indicators. The county-level SES variables include the percentage of mothers with college 
degrees, percentage of population uninsured, percentage of smokers or drinkers, percentage of 
minorities in the school district, and percentage of students with free or reduced price lunch 
status in the school district. When using employment outcomes, I also control for the number of 
years worked to control for differences in students’ employment experiences.  includes 
effects attributable to high school grades, admission test scores, first term grades, and credits 
earned. 
Eliminating Selection Bias With Instrumental Variable Strategy 
The OLS estimates from equation (1) may be biased if students with certain 
characteristics tend to enroll in the summer. If students with higher academic ability are more 
likely to take summer courses, they may have more successful outcomes regardless of whether or 
not they enroll in summer coursework. To eliminate the selection bias, the main analysis uses the 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. The most common instrument in studying the effect of 
enrollment in a certain type of institution or course is geographical variation (Card 1995; 





Instead of using actual summer credits in equation (1), the IV approach will first predict 
the number of summer credits enrolled in based on the proximity to the closest four-year college 
and other confounders in the two-stage least square estimation: 
	 	 	 	∈            (2) 
 is the geodetic distance, the shortest curve along the surface of the earth, from 
high school location to the closest four-year college in miles. I choose the proximity to any four-
year institution instead of an individual’s initial institution of college enrollment.9 Despite the 
fact that over 70 percent of students attend the college closest to home during the traditional 
academic year, many students do not and may choose to enroll in an institution closer to home 
during the summer. The distance to the closest four-year institution will be able to capture both 
groups of students.  
High school location is a proxy for the home address. The rationale behind the IV is that 
students are more likely to take a summer course if they live close to a four-year institution 
assuming that the proximity to a four-year institution does not affect enrollment in non-summer 
terms. 
In order for the IV estimation to be valid internally, the IV should (1) be related to the 
exogenous variable, (2) be as good as random, and (3) have no impact on any outcomes except 
through the exogenous variable. Section 5 will show the first stage results on testing the strength 
of the IV. The main concerns surround the last two assumptions since there is no foolproof way 
                                                            
9 Theoretically, proximity to two-year colleges may encourage summer enrollment by exposing students to academic 
environment more frequently and fostering a mindset of year-round education. Yet my results show that the distance 
to the closest two-year college does not correlate with summer credits enrolled in four-year institutions nor with the 
proximity to four-year colleges. I also find that the distance to the closest two-year college positively encourage 





to properly test them. The endogeneity of the distance IV may be an issue if individuals who 
place a higher value on education choose to live closer to a postsecondary campus (Card, 1995; 
Long & Kurlaender, 2009; Rouse, 1995; Xu & Jaggars, 2014). Particular to this study, it is also 
important that the IV does not correlate with non-summer enrollment and grades. Otherwise, the 
IV would no longer be random and would instead be directly correlated with academic or labor 
market outcomes. 
Another potential problem is that high-quality job opportunities may be more available in 
areas closer to four-year campuses (Miller, 2007). Universities with less desirable labor market 
conditions within their surrounding neighborhoods may encourage students who cannot 
otherwise secure a summer job to enroll in summer coursework non-randomly. On the other 
hand, if the job opportunities are better around the four-year institutions, students may be 
distracted from enrollment and have lower academic performance (Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1987; 
Scott-Clayton, 2011; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2003). 
Miller (2007) found that the distance-based IV estimates become non-significant after 
including county-level median household earnings to absorb the variations in job opportunities 
geographically. Other than including county-level average household income and many 
pretreatment variables on ability and SES, I also conduct a series of falsification tests to examine 
the correlation between distance and SES, employment, and enrollment in and out of summer. 
The four studies mentioned above also examined the differences in perception of distance 
across the country. The same amount of traveling time, for example, may be interpreted 
differently in urban, rural, and suburban settings. Regardless, this concern is minimal in the 
context of this study, which focuses on students in one state. The average distance to the closest 




37 miles of a college. The perception of distance as a concern is unlikely to arise within such 
small ranges of distance. Furthermore, I include rich geographical controls such as institutional 
fixed effects, congressional district fixed effects, metropolitan area fixed effects, and county-
level socioeconomic indicators throughout the analysis to avoid any institutional, urban/rural, 
and county-specific variations. 
 
5. Results 
This section presents the results of summer enrollment effects on various academic 
outcomes, describes the mechanisms of the effects, and provides proof of the validity of the IV.  
First Stage and Reduced Form Statistics 
The first stage results in Table 2.2 support the hypothesis in the Methods section that 
individuals living closer to a four-year institution are more likely to enroll in summer 
coursework. Column 2 shows that being one mile closer to a four-year institution increases the 
number of summer enrollment credits by 0.04 when controlling for all confounders available. 
The coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The F-statistics test 
also indicates distance is a strong IV for summer enrollment (Stevens, 2007). Row 3 to 10 show 
that some subgroups are more sensitive than others to distance when it comes to summer 
enrollment. For example, women are more sensitive to distance than men which is consistent 
with results in previous literature (Madden and White, 1980; Pickup, 1984). Distance is also a 
stronger IV for high achieving students than lower performing students. It is possible that high-
achieving students place a higher value on time efficiency so that they are more likely to shift 




Panel B presents the reduced form results when using distance directly to predict 
academic outcomes. The IV has a small and negative relationship to bachelor’s degree 
attainment and total credits earned and no correlation with earnings at the sixth or seventh year 
from college entry 
The Effect on Degree Attainment and Credits Accumulation  
The OLS and IV estimates are shown in Table 2.3. Panel A uses bachelor’s degree 
attainment as the outcome. The OLS estimate for each summer credit enrolled in during the first 
five years of college is on average 1.6 percentage points. If the marginal benefit of each summer 
credit remains constant, a summer course load of 3 to 4 credits will increase the completion rate 
by 4.8 to 6.4 percentage points. Table 2.1 shows that summer enrollees on average accumulated 
10 summer credits at the four-year level over their first five years of college, which thus yields a 
16 percentage points higher bachelor’s completion rate. 
The IV estimate in Table 2.3, row 1 is 2.6 percentage points. It may be surprising that the 
IV results are higher than the OLS results given that the summary statistics show that summer 
enrollees tend to have stronger academic backgrounds. One would expect the selection bias of 
OLS estimation to be positive. However, because the IV estimates measure the local average 
treatment effect, the estimates are only valid for students that are affected by distance. While 
both OLS and IV methods measure students that are sensitive to distance, the OLS estimates also 
calculate the average treatment effect based on the always-takers and never-takers, who choose 
whether or not to enroll in summer coursework regardless of proximity to college. The positive 
estimates reflect the fact that the effects of the compliers are much more positive than the sum of 




Rows 3 to 6 display the heterogeneous effects by gender. While the coefficients are 
generally similar to those in the pooled gender regression, the standard error of the IV regression 
for men is so large that the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. As we see from the 
first stage statistics, distance may not be a strong enough IV for men alone. Breaking down the 
sample by ability level, Rows 7 to 10 show that the IV estimate is larger for students with first-
term GPAs above the median. 
Panel E displays the IV estimates for the impact of summer credits enrolled in over five 
years on total credits earned within six years. I find that for those who are influenced by the IV, 
enrolling in one more summer credit in their first five years increases the total credits attainment 
by 3.6 credits. The IV estimates are higher for both men and lower performing students. 
The Effect on Time to Degree, Subsequent Fall Enrollment, Credits Earned, and GPA 
This section aims to explain the mechanisms by which summer enrollment improves 
bachelor’s degree completion. First, practitioners have promoted summer enrollment as a way 
for students to speed up the time to graduation, yet no rigorous evidence exists to support this 
claim. Second, according to the academic momentum theory, summer enrollment may encourage 
students to return in the fall, as attending classes would have become the norm. Additionally, the 
literature on summer learning loss predicts that summer enrollment has a positive effect on 
learning outcomes. To test these theories, I explore students’ subsequent enrollment, credits 
earned, and GPA outcomes after having enrolled in summer coursework. 
Time to bachelor’s degree completion. Some students may be encouraged to enroll in 
summer courses to complete a bachelor’s degree more quickly. Table 2.3 Panels C, D, and E 




years respectively. Since the completion effect is much stronger in earlier years, these panels 
indicate that summer credits may help students to graduate early. 
Enrollment. To examine the application of the academic momentum theory, Panel A of 
Table 2.4 presents the IV results on the impact of summer enrollment credits on student retention 
rate in the following fall. Instead of examining cumulative summer credits as in Table 2.3, the 
endogenous variable here is the number of summer credits earned in the summer term indicated. 
The coefficients show the gain in the enrollment rate in the following fall term in relation to each 
credit earned in the summer indicated. Panel A shows that enrolling in summer credits has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on enrollment in the following fall. The enrollment 
gain is between 17 and 24 percentage points for the pooled sample and is the strongest for the 
second summer after initial enrollment.  
Course load. Other than its effect on subsequent fall enrollment, taking summer courses 
can also impact academic momentum as a result of taking heavier course loads. Panel B shows 
strong support for this hypothesis. Each summer credit enrolled in correlates to an increase of 1.8 
to 3.1 credits earned in the fall, with the largest effect seen in the second summer after initial 
enrollment. 
To examine whether students are simply substituting credits they would have taken in the 
academic year for summer courses, Panel C presents the IV estimates on the credits earned in the 
following semester and finds no evidence of credits smoothing. 
Grade point averages. To evaluate the summer learning gain of enrolling summer 
credits, Panel D shows the effect of enrolling in one summer credit on GPA in the following fall 
term. None of the estimates are statistically different from zero. The K-12 literature found a 




postsecondary education may be different because all K-12 students must take a similar number 
of courses each term while postsecondary students are able to choose how many credits to take 
each term.  
Regardless, the results are encouraging. Even though Panel A, B, and C found that 
earning summer credit increased course load and retention for students who might otherwise 
have dropped out, Panel D suggests that summer enrollees performed just as well under these 
circumstances. 
From Summer Enrollment to Employment 
While the previous section shows that summer enrollment can lead to better college 
outcomes, this section examines whether the gains from summer enrollment carry over to the 
labor market. On the one hand, summer enrollees may have less work experience due to having 
less time available to work; on the other hand, summer enrollees may need to work more hours 
to pay for the summer tuition. Furthermore, summer enrollees graduate and start accumulating 
post-graduation work experience earlier than those who graduate later, and post-graduation work 
experience is valued more in the labor market than job experience in college. Without knowing 
the reason behind a student’s decision to work, it is hard to fathom which mechanism is stronger 
on average. 
Table 2.5 presents the IV per-credit-enrolled-in effect of summer enrollment on an 
individual’s future employment and earnings. The top panel shows that each summer credit 
enrolled in corresponds to a between 1.1 and 1.7 percentage points higher chance of employment 
in the fifth to seventh year after initial college enrollment. Only the estimate for the sixth year is 
statistically significant. The magnitude of gain in employment is similar to that for bachelor’s 




higher retention and bachelor’s degree completion rates among students who take summer 
courses. The subgroup analyses in Panel B and C show that the gains in the probability of 
employment fall mostly on women. 
The bottom panel displays the results when using earnings of the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
year after initial enrollment. Only the IV estimate for women in the seventh year is statistically 
significant. Once again, the gains in earnings concentrate on women due to the higher impact on 
degree attainment.  
Validity Tests 
The empirical methods section outlines some of the major concerns about the validity of 
using distance as an IV for college enrollment, namely: (1) motivated individuals or affluent 
families may tend to live nearer to four-year college campuses, and (2) better and/or more job 
opportunities may exist in regions around four-year institutions. Both concerns could undermine 
the assumption that distance as an IV should be as good as random and that it should not affect 
outcomes other than via the endogenous variable. 
If high-SES students tend to live closer to a four-year campus, they may have better 
outcomes regardless of their summer enrollment status. This concern is more significant in the 
setting where people are making enrollment decisions—especially when choosing between types 
of institutions (four-year versus two-year institutions) and between transfer paths (e.g., enrolling 
directly at a four-year institution versus transferring from a two-year institution into a 
baccalaureate program). Conditional on enrollment at a four-year university, this problem is 
minimized. 
Nonetheless, Table 2.6 presents empirical tests of the relationship between proximity to a 




correlation with SES indicators such as average household income, percentage of smokers, and 
percentage of low-income students in the county of residence. The results are the same using 
other SES indicators included in the regressions. 
In addition, Panel A of Table 2.7 shows the association between academic outcomes and 
distance over time. If students with higher academic motivation, resources, or academic ability 
live closer to four-year institutions, one should see a positive relationship between distance and 
GPA or credits earned in all years. First, no correlation is shown between distance and GPA. 
Second, distance is shown only to relate to credits earned in a way that is consistent with the 
summer enrollment analysis. Distance has no effect on credits earned during the academic year 
in the first year, but it does correlate with credits earned through the positive effect summer 
enrollment has on credits earned and on subsequent fall enrollment. 
The second concern over the validity of the IV surrounds the relationship between four-
year institutions and their neighboring labor market conditions. Row 4 of Table 2.6 shows that 
proximity to four-year institutions does not increase employment among two-year college 
students and therefore the job opportunities in proximity to four-year institutions are likely 
similar to those in neighborhoods farther away from the campuses. 
Panel B of Table 2.7 also provides the details of the relationship between distance and 
employment for four-year college students over time. If distance correlates with job 
opportunities, one should see strong, negative, and statistically significant relationships with all 
labor market outcomes over all years. The results in Panel B of Table 2.7 provide no support for 
this concern as only half of the coefficients are statistically significant. Proximity to four-year 




 Panel B also shows that distance does not affect earnings during the summer. It shows 
statistically significant but economically insignificant correlations between employment and 
distance during fall and spring terms in the early years. It indicates that students work 0.1–0.3 
percentage points more and earn 0.3–0.6 percentage points more over the academic year if they 
live one mile closer to a four-year institution.  
Though the correlation is very small, the fact that an association exists in the early years 
but not the latter years suggests that individuals adjust their work patterns in response to summer 
enrollment as opposed to the availability of job opportunities. Three observations support this 
statement. First, as mentioned above, distance does not have a consistent relationship throughout 
all years and all outcomes.  
Second, the strongest correlation between distance and employment occurs around the 
same time as when distance most strongly correlates with summer credits, which means that 
distance only affects employment through its effect on summer credits. Panel A in Table 2.7 
shows that the effect of distance on summer credits earned is cumulative and strongest for the 
first summer following the first academic year. Given that individuals with past summer 
enrollment experience are more likely to enroll in summer credits, the additional effect of 
distance on summer credits earned in the latter years is much smaller than that in the first year. In 
addition, the strongest effect of distance on employment occurs during the first two years, which 
corresponds to the strongest effect of distance on summer credits. Anticipating the tuition in the 
summer, students may work more all year round. Though students may work more hours to pay 
for summer tuition, the increase in credit loads may make it difficult to do so in later years. 
Because distance does not directly relate to employment outcomes through SES or job 




Table 2.7 shows the complex relationship between distance to a four-year college and 
employment and enrollment outcomes. With due diligence, Table 2.7 attempts to disentangle the 
effect of distance on  SES, academic outcomes, and employment outcomes and shows support 
for using distance as an IV for summer enrollment.  
To conclude, the IV estimations indicate that students who are sensitive to distance were 
more likely to complete a bachelor’s degree if they enrolled in courses over the summer. Further 
analysis suggests that summer enrollment increased bachelor’s degree completion rates as a 
result of increasing course enrollment in the fall rather than through improving students’ GPAs. 
These results lend support to the academic momentum theory. I find no evidence that summer 
enrollees completed a bachelor’s degree earlier than non-summer enrollees. Finally, summer 
enrollees were more likely to be employed in the sixth and seventh year after initial college 




Despite the widespread practice of summer enrollment at the college level, researchers 
have rarely looked into its causal effect on college and employment outcomes. The K-12 
literature has generally found encouraging results among students who engage in academic 
activities in the summer. At the college level, academic momentum theory predicts that summer 
enrollment may increase academic intensity, thus helping students to graduate and graduate 
quickly. Using a state administrative dataset and proximity to the closest four-year college as an 




theory and which may help explain the mechanism by which summer enrollment serves to 
increase bachelor’s degree completion rates. 
The IV results indicate that among students who are sensitive to distance, for each 
summer credit a student enrolls in, there is on average a 2.6 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of completing a bachelor’s degree. Further analysis suggests that the increase in the 
bachelor’s degree completion rate among summer enrollees is caused by an increase in the rate 
of enrollment and credits earned in the following fall semester. Despite taking more credits, 
summer enrollees in the sample had similar GPAs and time to degree completion as non-summer 
enrollees. The subgroup analysis shows that the gains in credits were higher among women. 
Given the current emphasis on bachelor’s degree completion among analysts, 
policymakers, and others, these results are informative and promising. The literature on college 
completion has so far largely overlooked the role of summer enrollment in fueling academic 
momentum and subsequent enrollment. The results of the current study support the notion that 
institutions should more fully utilize their buildings in the summer to provide courses and should 
encourage students to participate in summer coursework. Academic advisors should consider 
counseling students to spend the summer break in an academically productive way. Given the 
risk of academic momentum loss, students should perhaps work less and instead take at least one 
course in the summer or participate in a field-related internship.  
Three barriers undermine the ability or desire of college students to take summer courses. 
The first is the lack of summer financial aid. Currently, the federal Pell Grant is allocated only 
for the fall and spring semesters—students may only use the Pell Grant for summer courses if 
they have aid left over from the fall and spring academic terms, which rarely happens. Having 




increasing summer enrollment and thereby improving graduation rates. Indeed, this paper 
provides empirical support for bringing back year-round Pell Grants. It is worth noting that 
randomized control trials using financial incentives to encourage summer enrollment could be 
used to evaluate the benefit of summer enrollment.  
The second barrier to summer course participation is the status quo perception of summer 
break or summer vacation. The academic calendar has incorporated a summer break for a long 
time. In order to convince college personnel and students about the merits of summer 
coursework, academic advisors and others will need to change norms concerning the role of the 
summer term in student academic progression. Relatedly, the third barrier concerns the appeal of 
summer employment among students. Many college students work at summer jobs, but these are 
often not conducive to their academic goals. While a full-time wage may be attractive to 
students, institutions and advisors may need to help students weigh the benefits of working full-
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8. Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Summer Credit Enrollment in Each Year Among Students Enrolled in at Least 
One Summer Credit 
 
 
Note. The graphs are based on students enrolled in at least one summer credit. The location of each bar on the x-axis indicates the 
number of credits enrolled in by students represented in that bar. The y-axis height of each bar indicates the proportion of students 
































































































































































































Demographic characteristics   
Female 56% 53% 55% 51% 
White 75% 72% 74% 71% 
Black 12% 20% 18% 23% 
Hispanic 11% 2% 2% 2% 
Other race/ethnicity 2% 3% 4% 3% 
Age at enrollment     
18 or younger 58% 6% 7% 6% 
19-23 34% 92% 93% 92% 
24-29 3% 1% 0.6% 1% 
30 or older 5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 
   
Distance to the closest four-year college . 12.0 11.0 13.0 
Lives in a metropolitan area 55% 67% 68% 65% 
Entering year: 2005–06 . 36% 36% 35% 
Entering year: 2006–07 . 34% 34% 33% 
Entering year: 2007–08 . 31% 29% 32% 
Household Income $23,017 . . . 
   
County-level characteristics   
   Household income . $32,495 $32,521 $32,468 
   Percentage mothers with college degree . 40% 40% 40% 
   Percentage without insurance . 17% 17% 17% 
   Percentage smokers/drinkers . 23% 23% 23% 
   Percentage Black in school district . 29% 29% 30% 
   Percentage Hispanic in school district . 5% 6% 5% 
   Percentage other races in school district . 2% 2% 2% 
   Percentage receiving free/reduced lunch  56% 56% 56% 
   
Ever enrolled for summer credits (2- or 4-year) . 58% 100% 13% 
Four-year credits enrolled in during summer . 5.30 10.29 0.00 
Two-year credits enrolled in during summer . 1.04 1.18 0.88 
Percent of credits earned during summer . 5% 9% 1% 
   
High school GPA . 3.06 3.13 2.98 
GPA term 1 . 2.9 3.0 2.7 
GPA year 1 2.92 2.8 3.0 2.7 
Credits earned in term 1 . 12.2 13.1 11.3 
Credits earned in year 1 29 23.9 27.0 20.7 
Percent credits taken online . 6% 7% 5% 
Percent credits at the freshman and sophomore level . 72% 66% 78% 
Percent credits at the junior and seniors level . 21% 29% 12% 
   
Highest degree earned in 2013   
Certificates 2% 2% 1% 3% 
Associate degree 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Bachelor’s degree 58% 45% 64% 24% 











Error F N R2 
 
Panel A: First stage - Summer Credits Enrolled In 4 years  
1 All No -0.030*** [0.009]  14,267 0.002 
2 All Yes -0.037*** [0.009] 15.13 14,267 0.061 
3 Women No -0.025*** [0.009]  7,601 0.002 
4 Women Yes -0.046*** [0.011] 14.82 7,601 0.055 
5 Men No -0.035*** [0.012]  6,666 0.004 
6 Men Yes -0.028*** [0.010] 8.24 6,666 0.077 
        
7 First-term GPA below the median No -0.025** [0.010]  7,113 0.002 
8 First-term GPA below the median Yes -0.031*** [0.012] 6.46 7,113 0.086 
9 First-term GPA above the median No -0.033*** [0.010]  7,154 0.003 
10 First-term GPA above the median Yes -0.045*** [0.010] 18.59 7,154 0.044 
        
Panel B: Reduced Form  
7 Bachelor’s degree attainment (all) Yes -0.001** [0.000]  14,267 0.315 
8 Total Credits Earned (all) Yes -0.134*** [0.047]  14,267 0.440 
9 Wage 7th year from College Entry (all) Yes -2.751 [9.505]  14,267 0.364 
10 Probability of Employment in the 7th year 
(all) 
Yes -0.000* [0.000]  14,267 0.623 
        
Note. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to fall 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree, are residents of the state, and are enrolled full-time; covariates 
include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), geographic controls (congressional 
district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year controls (first term GPA, first-term 
credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES indicators (percentage of 
drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with college degrees, percent of 
White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free or reduced price lunch status). Regressions with 
employment outcome also controls for years of work experience and its square term. 















Error N R2 
Panel A: Bachelor’s degree attainment in Six Years 
1 All IV 0.026** [0.010] 14,267 0.352 
2 All OLS 0.016*** [0.001] 14,267 0.370 
3 Women IV 0.025** [0.010] 7,601 0.361 
4 Women OLS 0.017*** [0.001] 7,601 0.375 
5 Men IV 0.023 [0.019] 6,666 0.359 
6 Men OLS 0.016*** [0.001] 6,666 0.370 
       
7 First-term GPA below the median IV 0.022 [0.015] 7,113 0.300 
8 First-term GPA below the median OLS 0.020*** [0.001] 7,113 0.301 
9 First-term GPA above the median IV 0.029** [0.013] 7,154 0.278 
10 First-term GPA above the median OLS 0.014*** [0.001] 7,154 0.325 
       
Panel B: Total Credits Earned in Six Years 
1 All IV 3.595*** [1.033] 14,267 0.521 
2 All OLS 2.310*** [0.045] 14,267 0.558 
3 Women IV 2.621** [1.031] 7,601 0.551 
4 Women OLS 2.334*** [0.060] 7,601 0.553 
5 Men IV 5.208*** [1.737] 6,666 0.396 
6 Men OLS 2.296*** [0.064] 6,666 0.566 
       
7 First-term GPA below the median IV 5.179*** [1.595] 7,113 0.384 
8 First-term GPA below the median OLS 2.698*** [0.060] 7,113 0.528 
9 First-term GPA above the median IV 2.435** [1.018] 7,154 0.474 
10 First-term GPA above the median OLS 1.924*** [0.055] 7,154 0.481 
       
Panel C: Bachelor’s degree attainment after 4 years 
13 All IV 0.025*** [0.009] 14,267 0.094
14 All OLS 0.014*** [0.001] 14,267 0.126
Panel D: Bachelor’s degree attainment after 5 years 
15 All IV 0.012* [0.006] 14,267 0.046
16 All OLS 0.006*** [0.000] 14,267 0.074
Panel E: Bachelor’s degree attainment after 6 years 
17 All IV -0.002 [0.002] 14,267 0.017
18 All OLS 0.001*** [0.000] 14,267 0.042
       
Note. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to fall 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, are residents of the state, and are enrolled 
full-time; covariates in all regressions include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), 
geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year 
controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES 
indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with 
college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free or reduced price lunch 




Table 2.4: IV Results on the Effect of Enrolling in One Summer Credit on Enrollment in 
the Following Fall and Spring 
Summer Year Coefficients Standard Error N R2 
 
Panel A: Enrollment in the Following Fall
1. Summer 1 0.165** [0.082] 14,267  
2. Summer 2 0.239** [0.118] 14,267  
3. Summer 3 0.141** [0.069] 14,245  
4. Summer 4 0.172*** [0.055] 11,352  
     
Panel B: Credits earned in the Following Fall
1. Summer 1 2.071** [1.028] 14,267 0.209 
2. Summer 2 3.129* [1.615] 14,267  
3. Summer 3 1.789* [0.947] 14,245 0.123 
4. Summer 4 2.213*** [0.581] 11,352  
     
Panel C: Total Credits earned in the Following Fall and Spring
1. Summer 1 3.566 [2.194] 14,267 0.259 
2. Summer 2 2.380* [1.304] 14,267 0.129 
3. Summer 3 1.767** [0.820] 14,267 0.104 
4. Summer 4 1.312*** [0.387] 14,267  
     
Panel D: GPA earned in the Following Fall 
1. Summer 1 0.022 [0.084] 11,130 0.392 
2. Summer 2 0.026 [0.093] 10,000 0.294 
3. Summer 3 0.04 [0.111] 9,165 0.241 
4. Summer 4 –0.07 [0.175] 5,959 0.088 
     
Note. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to fall 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, are residents of the state, and are enrolled 
full-time; covariates in all regressions include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), 
geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year 
controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES 
indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with 
college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free or reduced price lunch 
status). 






Table 2.5: IV Results of Enrolling in One Summer Credit on Employment Outcomes in 





Error N R2 
 
Outcomes: Probability of Employment 
Panel A: All 
1. Year 5 0.017 [0.012] 14,267  
2. Year 6 0.015* [0.009] 14,267 0.432 
3. Year 7 0.011 [0.007] 14,267 0.594 
Panel B: Women 
1. Year 5 0.009 [0.012] 7,601 0.043 
2. Year 6 0.013 [0.009] 7,601 0.467 
3. Year 7 0.018** [0.008] 7,601 0.559 
Panel C: Men 
1. Year 5 0.035 [0.023] 6,666  
2. Year 6 0.020 [0.018] 6,666 0.380 
3. Year 7 -0.001 [0.012] 6,666 0.598 
     
Outcomes: Annual Earnings 
Panel D: All     
1. Year 5 214 [355] 14,267 0.055 
2. Year 6 81 [358] 14,267 0.245 
3. Year 7 73 [257] 14,267 0.364 
Panel E: Women 
1. Year 5 78 [308] 7,601 0.073 
2. Year 6 -51 [308] 7,601 0.278 
3. Year 7 530** [251] 7,601 0.320 
Panel F: Men 
1. Year 5 540 [811] 6,666 0.023 
2. Year 6 378 [793] 6,666 0.209 
3. Year 7 -731 [507] 6,666 0.236 
     
Note. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to fall 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, are residents of the state, and are enrolled 
full-time; covariates in all regressions include year of work experience, demographic characteristics (gender, race, 
and age at enrollment), geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a 
metropolitan area), initial four-year controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed 
effects), and county-level SES indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, 
household income, mothers with college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school 
district, free or reduced price lunch status); regressions in panel D pool earnings from the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
year from all individuals with, robust standard errors are clustered at the student level, work experience is controlled 
and equals to the year worked up till the year of the outcome measured. 









Error N R2 
1 Household income 14.394 [13.209] 14,267 0.875 
2 Percentage of smokers –0.000 [0.000] 14,267 0.312 
3 Percentage of students with free/reduced 
price status in school district 
–0.000 [0.000] 14,267 0.863 
4 Worked in term 1 and 2 (two-year 
students) 
–0.000 [0.001] 9,116 0.054 
Note. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to fall 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, are residents of the state, and are enrolled 
full-time; covariates in all regressions include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), 
geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year 
controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES 
indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with 
college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free or reduced price lunch 
status). 






Table 2.7: Per-Mile Effect of Distance on Academic and Employment Outcomes in the First 
Four Years 
Panel A: Academic Outcomes 
Academic 
Year 
Credits Earned in 
Summer 
Credits Earned in 
Academic Year Enrollment in Fall GPA 
1. Year 1 –0.005*** [0.002] –0.004 [0.004] NA NA –0.000 [0.000] 
2. Year 2 –0.006** [0.003] –0.019* [0.011] –0.001** [0.000] –0.000 [0.001] 
3. Year 3 –0.008*** [0.003] –0.027** [0.012] –0.001*** [0.000] –0.000 [0.001] 
4. Year 4 –0.007*** [0.003] –0.035*** [0.013] –0.001** [0.001] –0.000 [0.001] 












1. Year 1 –0.003*** [0.001] –0.003** [0.001] –0.002*** [0.001] –0.001 [0.001] 
2. Year 2 –0.001** [0.001] –0.006*** [0.002] –0.002*** [0.000] 0.001 [0.001] 
3. Year 3 –0.001*** [0.000] –0.001 [0.002] –0.001** [0.001] 0.000 [0.001] 
4. Year 4 –0.001 [0.000] –0.000 [0.001] –0.001 [0.000] 0.001 [0.001] 
Note. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets; sample includes all beginning four-year students from fall 2005 
to fall 2008 who intend to earn a bachelor’s degree in the public sector, are residents of the state, and are enrolled 
full-time; covariates in all regressions include demographic characteristics (gender, race, and age at enrollment), 
geographic controls (congressional district fixed effects, a dummy for being in a metropolitan area), initial four-year 
controls (first term GPA, first-term credit earned, initial four-year schools fixed effects), and county-level SES 
indicators (percentage of drinkers/smokers, percentage without health insurance, household income, mothers with 
college degrees, percent of White/Asian/Black/Hispanic students in the school district, free or reduced price lunch 
status). 








School is (not) out for Summer? The Impact of Year-round Pell 
Grants on Academic and Employment Outcomes  
 
1. Introduction 
Does extra financial aid for the summer lead to completion and earnings gains? The Pell 
grant is the largest source of financial aid to low-income college students, allocating over $28 
billion in the academic year 2015-2016 to 7.6 million students, most of whom have family 
incomes below $50,000 (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2013). While the traditional Pell covers a 
substantial proportion of college tuition, the maximum financial aid a student can receive only 
amounts to two semesters worth of full-time credits without any support for summer classes. 
In light of this limitation, the year-round Pell (YRP) was implemented in academic year 
(AY) 2009-2010 and AY 2010-2011, allowing eligible students to receive a second Pell grant in 
the same fiscal year to cover summer tuition.  To ensure that the grant is used towards degree 
acceleration, students were only eligible for the second award if they attended college full-time 
for two terms and subsequently enrolled at least part-time in the last term of the same AY.  
Reducing the cost of education should increase the demand for education, but the Pell 
literature found only small positive impacts from such education subsidies. Presumably, the 
potential positive treatment effects were masked by a number of factors in prior data analysis, 
including 1) the exclusion of non-marginal students around the Pell eligibility cutoff who had 
higher needs and received larger grant awards in regression discontinuity analysis, 2) the 
complexity of financial aid applications, and 3) an institutional crowding-out effect of financial 




Given the potential benefits of the YRP and the sparse literature on this topic, this study 
looks at the causal effects of the YRP and will be the first to examine outcomes beyond the first 
summer, such as short-term credits accumulation, credential attainment, financial aid 
disbursements, and earnings during college in subsequent terms.  
I use a two-period optimization model in which students choose the level of education 
based on the projected returns and costs. If the crowding-out and employment effects during 
enrollment are small, the introduction of the YRP should be expected to lead to higher summer 
enrollment, completion, and earnings.  
Using restricted-use state administrative data, I employ the difference in difference (DID) 
approach to compare the difference in the outcomes of full-time and part-time students enrolling 
before and after the YRP implementation. I find that YRP eligibility increases the Pell grant 
disbursement in the summer by $312 per student, improves the probability of enrollment by 8.3 
percentage points, and leads to 0.7 more credits earned per student in the summer. These 
improvements in academic support and achievement in turn induces completion gains of three 
percentage points in certificates and 0.7 percentage points in associate degrees. The DID 
estimates show some evidence of crowding-out of institutional aid, but that is without impact on 
loans. The employment estimates show a $681 earnings gain per student in their third year from 
college entry. Subgroup analysis of the data shows higher short-term credential completion rates 
for women, higher associate degree graduation rates for men, and larger academic and 
employment gains for older as compared to younger students.  
The next section will discuss literature pertaining to the traditional Pell and YRP. In 
section 3, I develop a stylized model illustrating the decision YRP eligible students face when 




evaluates the underlying assumptions. Section 6 presents the results and robustness checks, and 
my conclusions follow in section 7. 
2. The Year-Round Pell Grant Program 
The Year-round Pell Grant 
The Bush administration signed the YRP into law under the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act in August 2008, but since the final YRP regulations were not published until 
October 2009, most colleges did not implement the policy until summer 2010 (Department of 
Education 2012).   
 The purpose of the YRP was to accelerate degree completion, so students were only 
eligible for a second Pell grant if they had completed at least 24 credits prior to the summer 
semester covered by the YRP and also enrolled at least half-time (6 credits) in the last term of the 
AY. The YRP disbursement is calculated in the same way as for the traditional Pell: by 
evaluating the Expected Family Contribution, student cost of attendance, and enrolled credits for 
each term. The maximum disbursement the student can receive via the YRP is therefore the same 
as the maximum Pell grant disbursement he/she received for a term of full-time enrollment. An 
estimated 1.2 million Pell grant recipients benefited from the YRP in the AY 2009-2010, 
receiving an additional $1,700 on average for their second grant (Congressional Budget Office 
2013). The total cost was approximately $2 billion, amounting to six percent of the total Pell 
Grant disbursements for that year. 
The federal government eliminated the YRP effectively July 1, 2011 due to a “lack of 
evidence” that the YRP was effective and due to a cost that was twice what had been expected 




accordingly eliminated in order to meet the 11.2 billion funding shortfall in the Pell grant 
program, whose cost had nearly doubled from $18.2 billion to $35.6 billion between AY 2008-
09 and AY 2010-2011 (Department of Education 2013).  
Policy makers have been trying to reinstate the YRP through numerous legislative 
initiatives since Jan 2015, the latest of which being a spending bill for June 2017 that included a 
$2 billion expansion for the Pell Grant program with a provision for the YRP to be funded by 
$1.2 billion of the Pell grant surplus from June 2016. The YRP provision passed the Senate but 
failed in the House. 
The Effect of Need-based Grants 
Grant disbursements should theoretically reduce the cost of education and increase the 
quantity demanded for college, but so far the empirical evidence has shown at most only small 
positive impacts from such education subsidies. In contrast, some studies have found that the Pell 
grant had no impact on enrollment (Carruthers and Welch, 2015, Hansen 1983; Kane 1995; 
Rubin, 2011), credits accumulation, or degree attainment (Marx and Turner, 2017). A growing 
body of academics think that on the basis of recent studies, an increase of 3-6% in enrollment 
can be found per $1,000 in grant disbursment (Deming and Dynarski, 2010). Focusing mostly on 
traditional-age students, these quasi-experimental studies looked at grants provided by the social 
security benefit program (Dynarski, 2003), state scholarships (Abraham and Clark, 2006, 
Dynarski, 2000, 2004; Kane, 2003), and Pell grants (Bettinger, 2004) using state data. 
Several factors have been shown to limit the impact of the Pell Grant so far: first, several 
of the studies mentioned above use regression discontinuity approach, which focus on the local 
average treatment effect only among the marginal students around the eligibility cutoff. This is 




not included in the analysis. In contrast,   in that subset of studies that looked specifically at 
nontraditional students, positive gains were found for older students, veterans, and students from 
the bottom half of the income distribution (Alon, 2011; Barr, 2014; Bound and Turner, 2002; 
Lovenheim and Owens, 2014; Seftor and Turner 2002).  
Second, the complexity of financial aid applications has undermined aid effectiveness 
and disproportionally harmed the individuals that need it the most (Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, 
and Sanbonmatsu 2012; Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2006; Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2008; 
Kane, 1994). Due to the challenge of simply applying for federal aid, many eligible low-income 
students simply pass on the opportunity to apply for or receive a Pell Grant. 
Third, some schools increase Pell Grant recipients’ net tuition cost by reducing 
institutional aid and grants in order to capture the federal aid (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002; 
Turner 1998). Turner (2014) estimated that institutions on average crowded-out 12 of Pell grant 
funding through price discrimination, with the capture rate being the lowest at public colleges 
and highest at private nonprofit colleges.  
Finally, Marx and Turner (2017) suggested that grant aid may actually reduce education 
attainment through reducing borrowing, thereby offsetting the expected gain from the grant. 
They showed that each dollar of Pell grant reduces loans by $1.8 among borrowers in a 
university system with a fixed cost of borrowing. Their results suggested that the increase in Pell 
grant funding might make it no longer worthwhile to pay the fixed cost of a smaller loan and 
cause students to reduce schooling to shift consumption to the present.  
The Pell literature sheds light on several important points regarding the analysis of the 
YRP. First, the impact of the YRP should be larger than that of traditional grants especially when 




nontraditional students sensitive to college price or students at the public colleges with low grant 
capture rates. Also, when the comparison is made among students who already have access to the 
Pell grant, the complexity of the application should not be a barrier to enrollment in the YRP. 
Furthermore, the YRP provides an incentive to accumulate more credits, which should 
theoretically produce better outcomes than the traditional Pell grant that has no such provision. 
Finally, Marx and Turner (2017) illustrate the importance of looking at other student behavior in 
addition to academic outcomes. 
The Effect of the YRP 
A handful of studies have examined the YRP (Katsinas, Davis, Friedel, Koh and Grant 
2011; Katsinas, Davis, Joh and Grant 2012; Bannister and Kramer 2015; Friedmann 2016), but 
only two studies attempted to use causal methods. Using the difference-in-difference (DID) 
approach, Bannister and Kramer (2015) found that the YRP on average increased enrolled 
summer credits by 1.5 credits per student for the 4,900 students from one community college in 
Florida. Yet the ability to generalize their results may be limited by their focusing only on one 
school. Using the same method and data from the California Community College system, 
Friedmann (2016) showed that the YRP led to an increase in summer credits enrollment of 0.4 
credits per student on average. However, Friedmann did not find an increase in the external 
margin of students enrolling in the summer or in the percentage of students earning over six 
credits in the summer, an eligibility requirement for the YRP. Despite having results consistent 
with Bannister and Kramer (2015), a limitation of Friedmann’s study (2016) is the lack of 
outcomes measured beyond the first summer. As Marx and Turner (2016) demonstrated, the 
positive effect of Pell grants on enrolled credits per student does not necessarilytranslate into a 




In sum, much research is left to fully characterize the impact of the YRP. The literature 
up to this point suffers from numerous limitations: many papers are based on data from two 
decades ago, follow-up periods are too short, and the range of outcomes evaluated are too narrow, 
with only one paper looking at the effect of the Pell grant on students’ loan patterns (Marx and 
Turner, 2017) and none evaluating its impact on labor market outcomes. My paper will fill some 
of the gaps in the literature by 1) focusing on community college students, who are 
predominately nontraditional, adult, and low-income; (2) Using a difference-in-difference 
approach and administrative data from one community college system to look for the first time at 
the effect of the YRP on outcomes after the first summer such as degree completion and labor 
market outcomes (3); estimating the impact of the YRP on loans, other non-Pell financial aid, 
and employment patterns during enrollment. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The introduction of the YRP provides a second Pell for eligible students to use towards 
summer tuition. Students must already be Pell recipients, enrolled full-time in the fall and spring 
semesters, and at least half-time enrolled in the summer to be eligible. The relative cost to 
enrolling year-round and full-time is therefore lower after the implementation of the YRP. 
Building on previous literature, I develop a stylized two-period optimization model to predict the 
impact of the grant on students’ academic and employment outcomes.  
To formalize the model, let person i’s cost of education (  in the first period be the 
difference between the sticker tuition price  and Pell reimbursement. The Pell grant contains 
two components: the year-round 	and traditional Pell reimbursement . The higher the 




with the level of education ( ) Pell grant recipients chose, which ranges from 1 to K. The set K 
contains the different levels of schooling individuals can attain, including some credits, 
certificates, diplomas, associate degrees. Since the credits requirement increases with K, tuition 
( ) also rises monotonically with K.  
∑ 	 , 1 ∙ 1  .     (1) 
Income or the opportunity cost of education in the first period ) is modeled as the sum 
of earnings during enrollment and other non-Pell grant subsidies ( ). The model allows both 
components to vary with the level of education chosen. The term ∙  takes into account any 
crowding-out effect of institional or state aid by the YRP, when institution or state try to absorb 
the increase in grant by reducing their financial assistance to students. Both  and  are positive 
ranges with zero to one. The opportunity cost of enrolling in more schooling increases with K.  
1 ∙ ∙ 1 .        (2) 
Using the definition in equation (1) and (2), the budget constraints in the initial period are: 
,           (3) 
where the consumption in non-education goods and education net of the Pell grant disbursement 
is no more than the sum of current income, net tuition subsidies other than the YRP and net 
saving or borrowing from the future income.  could be invested or borrowed at an interest rate 
of . 
 The budget constraint for the second period is: 
	 | 	 1 .          (4) 
An individual will receive future return |  conditional on the level of education chosen. The 





Granting that the hours of work and leisure are fixed, all Pell grant recipients face the 
following two-period optimization problem: 
max 	 , 		 	 ∝ 	          (5) 
subject to budget constraints in equation 3 and 4. To maximize utility from consumption, 
individuals choose E weighting on | 	and the cost of attaining it.  
The model has the following hypotheses regarding the introduction of YRP for YRP 
eligible students: (1) As seen in equation 1, the YRP lowers the net cost of education and should 
lead to higher level of summer enrollment and credits, (2) with increased credits accumulation as 
a result of the YRP, student will improve their persistence and graduation rates, (3) equation 2 
indicates that the YRP may lead to crowding out effect of state or institutional financial aid, yet it 
remains a empirical question, and (4) with increased graduation rates, I hypothesize that students 
with YRP will have higher earnings after leaving college.  
4. Data 
Data Description 
My sample consists of four cohorts of first-time degree-seeking students who enter the 
community college system of an anonymous state in the fall semesters of 2006 - 2009. Students 
can earn three kinds of credentials: certificates (12-18 credits), diplomas (36-48 credits), and 
Associate Degrees (64-76 credits). The data includes demographic characteristics, transcripts, 
financial aid, and credential information up to the summer of 2010. Additional credential data is 
obtained through the National student clearinghouse (NSC) that includes data from any public or 
private college up through February 2012. In addition, quarterly earnings adjusted to 2010 




The comprehensive nature and the large sample size of this dataset make it well suited to 
answer my research questions. Completion and labor market results are followed for up to at 
least 2.5 years after enrolling in college for the first time. This data also enables me to observe 
the term by term variations of students’ credits attainments, financial aid behaviors, and 
employment patterns during the first year of enrollment.  
With the goal of evaluating the impact of the YRP on college degree seekers, I restricted 
my sample to Pell recipients enrolled in a community college credentials program, thereby 
dropping individuals in enrichment or high school programs. I also dropped students intending to 
transfer since the data do not provide any transcripts for transfer students. And although the NSC 
data provides information on degree attainments out of this community college system, the short 
follow-up period makes it impossible to observe any bachelor’s degree attainments. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample, displaying student 
characteristics, academic outcomes, and labor market statistics for students enrolling before and 
during 2009 by enrollment status in the first term. The student composition of this sample is 
typical of most community college systems with a high proportion of minority, low-income, and 
older students. Up to 50 percent of the student body is non-white. Age of enrollment varies from 
18 to 50 with a median of 22. Over 60 percent have zero expected family contribution (EFC) and 
therefore are eligible to receive the maximum Pell grant. 
 The demographic characteristics of full-time and part-time students look similar, except 
that full-time students are less likely to be black. Full-time students also have more credits 




Compared to students enrolled prior to 2009, those who entered in 2009 are slightly older 
and demonstrated higher financial need. They are also slightly less likely to be employed the 
year prior to entering college. If employed, the 2009 cohort earned less than the cohorts entering 
before.  
YRP eligible students are full-time students who enrolled in 2009. They are at least 10 
percentage points more likely to enroll and earn over six credits in the summer than full-time 
students in the previous years.  
To better understand the distribution of the Pell grant, Figure 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the 
Pell grant disbursement by enrollment status, year enrolled, and EFC. Panel A shows evidence 
that full-time students who enrolled prior to 2009 exhausted their Pell grant before the first 
summer. After the implementation of the policy, full-time students who enrolled in 2009 were 
able to receive extra Pell grant disbursements for the summer. Additionally, Panel A and B show 
that the increase in maximum Pell grant disbursements in 2009 has raised the total Pell amount 
by similar amounts for full-time and part-time students, yet the effect is much larger in the 
summer. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the credits earned and Pell grant disbursements for YRP recipients 
who enrolled in 2009 with full-time enrollment in the fall and spring semesters and who still 
received Pell grants in the summer. On average, they earned 14 credits in the fall and spring 
semesters, which was more than the full-time requirement of 12 credits. The total credits earned 
in the summer ranges between 3 and 20 credits with a mean of 8 credits. Over 71 percent of the 
YRP recipients earned over six credits in the summer. Finally, Table 3.2 also indicates that the 
amount of average YRP disbursement is substantial: over $1,500 or 66 percent of the amount 




5. Estimation Strategy 
Different-In-Difference Model 
To examine the effect of the YRP, this paper follows previous research and uses a 
difference-in-difference strategy by comparing the differences in the outcomes of the full-time 
and part-time student enrolling before or after the YRP implementation. The key equation is: 
∗  
where  is the outcome of interest, such as enrollment and credits earned in the summer,  
completion rates, financial aid, employment rates, and earnings in subsequent terms and years.	 
 is a binary variable which equals to 1 if individual i enrolls in college for the first 
time after the implementation of the YRP. It estimates the general cohort effect of enrolling after 
the summer of 2008.  equals to 1 if an individual is full time in the first semester. Since 
students must accumulate at least 24 credits in the fall and spring semesters to be eligible for the 
YRP, enrolling part-time in the first semester makes it impossible to receive the YRP. This 
variable essentially also captures any systematic differences in outcomes between full-time and 
part-time students. ∗  is the interaction between 	and , which captures 
the effect of the YRP.  
 is a vector of demographic characteristics, such as race, gender, high school 
graduation status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family 
contribution, and Pell grant disbursement in the first term, college, and major fixed effects. Years 





Evaluation of the DID Assumptions  
My paper will address two concerns that may potentially violate the parallel trend 
assumption required for DID. First, the recession in 2008 may change the composition of the 
cohort enrolling in the fall of 2009 and making it unable to be compared with the prior cohorts. 
The  variable will capture some of the cohort-specific effects. Controlling for first semester 
financial aid and academic information in all regressions also takes away effects that are 
attributed to socioeconomic status or ability. Figure 3.2 also confirms that the student 
composition of the 2009 cohort is similar to prior cohorts in terms of the percentage of students 
with zero EFC, EFC in the first term (fall), earnings one year prior to enrollment, percentage 
with full-time status, credits earned in the first term, and GPA in the first term. 
Second, the recession may also influence the composition of full-time or part-time 
students in different ways. Reassuringly, Panel D of Figure 3.2 shows that the percentage of full-
time remains at 52 percent between 2008 and 2009. Figure 3.3 also shows that the composition 
of these two groups of students is comparable across years in terms of the percentage of minority 
students and the percentage who graduated from high school. The EFC of part-time students 
enrolled in 2009 looks slightly lower than the previous cohorts. Yet the differences do not affect 
the credits earned in the fall and spring terms. As expected, the credits earned in the summer 
spiked with the full-time students enrolled in 2009 and not with part-time students or students 
enrolled before 2009. 
Furthermore, my subgroup analysis looks at a subset of the sample that has intent to 
enroll in a certificate or diploma program. These students are likely to have different goals and 
responses to the YRP than students enrolled in an associate degree program. They face lower 




Figure 3.4 confirms that the percentages of students with the intent to enroll in certificate 
programs are similar across cohorts and across students with different enrollment statuses. 
Similar to the full sample, the student composition is stable across cohorts for all characteristics 
with the slight exception of the percentage of students with zero EFC. The percentage of students 
intending to enroll in associate programs with zero EFC seems to increase slightly overtime.  
Finally, the next section will provide event study plots to evaluate the year-by-year trend 
for a set of outcomes adjusted for the year trend, full-time or part-time trend, and other covariates. 
As the last robustness check, I will run my key analysis on a subgroup of students whose parallel 
trend assumption looks the most plausible. 
6. Results 
Summer Enrollment 
Table 3.3 shows the estimates of the effect of the YRP on academic outcomes of the first 
summer. Each row is a separate regression showing the coefficient of the interaction term 
between 	and . Panels 1 to 4 test whether the introduction of the YRP affects the Pell 
disbursements and summer course taking patterns among potential students. Without covariates, 
the estimated effects of the eligibility of the YRP are $321 per student for the whole sample and 
$488 per student for those enrolled in certificate programs. The estimates remain stable after 
adding covariates.  
In panels 2 and 3, the DID estimates of the effect of YRP eligibility on the probability of 
summer enrollment and credits earned are 8.3 percentage points and 0.7 credits per student 
respectively when including covariates. Panel 4 measures summer impact in an alternative way. 




the summer. Panel 4 indicates that eligible students are six percentage points more likely to have 
earned over six credits in the summer.  
Consistent with the predictions above, the estimates on summer outcomes (panel 2 to 4) 
for students enrolled in certificate or diploma programs is generally twice that for the whole 
sample.  
Credits Earned and Degree Completion 
To explore whether students engage in credit smoothing behavior as a result of the YRP, 
Panels 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 display the estimates on credits earned in each semester and find no 
evidence for any smoothing behavior. 
Panels 3 to 5 of Table 3.4 estimate the impact of the YRP on completion rates. The 
difference-in-difference estimate for certificate attainment is 0.3 percent and not statistically 
significant using the entire sample, yet it is three percent and statistically significant for students 
with an intention to earn a certificate.   
There is no impact on diploma completion rates, but the completion rate is 0.7 percentage 
points higher for those eligible for the YRP.  
It is important to point out that the majority of certificate holders have excess credits or 
credits that do not count towards their degree requirement. On average, individuals earned 21 
credits in the first year, which is more than the 12 to 18 credits required for certificate programs .  
Adding a component of academic advisement to the program may ensure the efficient use of 
federal funding and students’ resources.  
Financial Aid 
 Table 3.5 explores the effect of the YRP on various financial aid outcomes. Recent 




aid. Marx and Turner (2017) found an over 100 percent reduction in loans as a result of increased 
Pell disbursements within $1000 of the Pell Grant eligibility threshold when there is a fixed cost 
in borrowing. Given that the amount of the YRP is relatively small, Panels 1 to 3 find that it has 
no impact on loan patterns.  
Turner (2014) found that institutions may try to capture the increase in the federal grant 
by reducing institutional aid. Panels 4 to 6 show that the estimates for other aid, excluding the 
federal Pell grants or loans, are positive in the fall semester and negative in the spring semester. 
Overall, the net effect on state and institutional aid is about -$77 or 25% of the gains in the YRP 
for the first year for the whole sample and -$121 for students with intent to complete a certificate. 
Accordingly, my results show some evidence of the crowding-out effect.  
Labor market outcomes 
 The last set of outcomes concerns the probability of employment and earnings during and 
after enrollment up to three years from college entry. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that YRP eligible 
students and YRP recipients on average take up to two courses in the summer. In anticipation of 
less income from the summer, some YRP eligible students may increase employment during 
enrollment. The impact should be minimal given that the additional course load is small. Table 
3.6 suggests that the impact on the probability of employment is 3.7 percentage points higher 
with an average increase in earnings of $146 in the fall for the full sample. Otherwise, no 
employment impact is found in the spring or the summer semesters. 
 Panels 1 to 3 of Table 3.7 present the DID estimates of the impact of YRP eligibility on 
the probability of employment in the first three years from college entry. I find no statistically 




Most students are still in school during the first two years. As a result, the introduction of 
the YRP also does not seem to influence earnings of eligible students in the first two years. Yet, 
Panel 6 indicates that the YRP induces an increase of earnings in the third year from college 
entry of $681 for the entire sample and $1390 for those in a certificate program. The YRP is 
beneficial for individual and society as a whole through federal and state tax revenue. 
Subgroup Analysis 
 Table 3.8 shows a set of key estimates on academic and employment outcomes by gender 
and whether they enrolled in a certificate program. The results are generally consistent with 
Tables 3.3 to 3.7 with some variations by gender. The DID estimates are positive and statically 
significant in the first summer for both women and men. All the gains in certificate and diploma 
completion rates accrue to women. YRP eligible women, who enrolled in a certificate program, 
are 5.8 percentage points more likely to receive a certificate within one year. Female YRP 
eligible individuals are 0.1 percentage points more likely to earn a diploma. The gain in associate 
degree completion rates, however, concentrates among men. Male YRP eligible students are 1.2 
percentage points more likely to have completed an associate degree in 2.5 years. 
 The YRP seems to induce more YRP eligible women to work in the first term, yet YRP 
eligible men tend to earn more on average in that term. In the third year of college enrollment, 
YRP eligible students of both gender experience similar earning gains. 
 Table 3.9 examines the same set of outcomes by the age of enrollment. Pell grants may 
have a different impact on the group of students who enroll within two years of high school 
graduation versus those attend later (Seftor and Turner, 2002). The DID estimates on the amount 




completion rates and earnings only concentrate on older students. These findings are consistent 
with the research mentioned previously that investigated the effect of Pell grants on adult 
students. 
Robustness Check 
The method section provides some checks on the composition of full-time versus part-
time students before and after the YRP policy implementation. Figure 3.5 offers a more robust 
test to the parallel trend assumption by showing the year-by-year interaction term on a set of 
outcomes controlling for enrollment status, enrolled year, and all other covariates in previous 
tables. The coefficient shown is similar to the ∗  interaction term shown before. 
Instead of interacting  with pre and post-2009 enrollment status,  is interacted with 
the actual year of enrollment: ∗ .  
For the parallel trend assumption to hold, the coefficients for 2009 should ideally be 
different from the rest and the coefficients for cohorts 2006, 2007, and 2008 should be similar. 
At the very least, there should not be a strong trend over time. Figure 3.5 shows support for the 
assumption and a strong effect of YRP eligibility for all academic outcomes except for diploma 
attainment. 
While the recession does not seem to influence student characteristics or academic 
behavior, it may influence the earnings three years from college enrollment. For example, the 
third year of the 2006 cohort is 2009, which is the end of the recession. The third year of the 
2009 cohort is 2012, by which time the economy is recovering. Figure 3.5 displays the earning 
levels in the second and third year from college entry for the whole sample and supports for the 




Overall, I find that students who are eligible for the YRP receive more Pell grants in the 
summer, which then leads to gains in credits earned, completion rates, and earnings. The YRP 
has almost no impact on loans, yet it reduces other state and institutional aid slightly. Subgroup 
analysis suggests that the YRP has a larger impact on the short-term credential completion rate 
for women and on the associate degree graduation rate for men. Older students also experience 
larger gains than younger students. Robustness checks show support for the parallel trend 
assumption. Yet event study plots indicate that the recession may inflate the third year earnings 
for the 2009 cohort. When excluding students with the inflated third year earnings, all results are 
identical though the earnings gains are reduced slightly. 
7. Conclusion 
As college tuition and the enrollment of nontraditional students continue to rise, policies 
that can help students graduate in a timely matter become increasingly important. Nontraditional 
students enrolled in community colleges are often older, employed full-time, low-income, 
minority, or first-generation students, who are more vulnerable to credits constraints. The 
traditional Pell grant covers only two semesters of full-time enrollment, leaving no support for 
low-income students who want to take courses in the summer. The short-lived YRP program 
gave extra summer funding for those who enrolled full-time in the prior two semesters. I exploit 
the exogenous variations of the timing of the introduction of the policy and its eligibility 
requirements to shed light on the impact of providing summer tuition support for nontraditional 
students. 
Using the DID approach, I find that for each $1,000 of additional YRP disbursement, 




completion rate by 2.4 percent points. When breaking down by age of enrollment, the 
completion and labor market gains accrue primarily to adult students, who enrolled at age 20 or 
above. That increase in enrollment is substantially larger than the consensus of three to six 
percentage points previously published in Deming and Dynarski (2010). The main reason for this 
is the inclusion of all Pell-eligible students in my sample, thereby avoiding limiting the analysis 
to only those around the Pell eligible threshold or those who may have been hindered by the 
financial aid application. I also do not find any crowding-out effect on loans as Marx and Turner 
(2017) did. Additionally, the crowding-out effect on state and institutional aid seems too small to 
influence the positive outcome. 
Despite the limitations of short follow-up and having a single cohort eligible for the YRP, 
my paper provides the only evidence on the effect of the YRP on completion rates and labor 
market outcomes to date. It also provides an upper boundary to the effect of need-based grants. 
My research will provide important guidance to the federal government and advocacy groups as 
they continue with their effort to reinstate the YRP.  
This paper also contributes to a broader set of conversations. Does more money matter in 
higher education? My results say “yes” and that adult students especially benefit from increased 
educational funding. Are there certain conditions that would maximize the impact of grants? 
Though not directly tested in this paper, the sample restrictions in this paper provide the best 
case scenario, where individuals have high financial needs and no complications with aid 
applications, and results in higher estimates than found in other grant studies. The YRP is also 
small enough that it does not trigger any aid crowding-out or changes in employment during 




student composition, structure and design of the grant programs, and other unknown factors that 
can maximize the impact of grant programs.  
Finally, would individuals be willing to go to school all year-round? This study shows 
that when incentivized, more students would enroll in summer courses in additional to the fall 
and spring semesters. In fact, as tuition continues to rise, finding ways to attend schools all year-
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Figure 3.2: Students Characteristics by Cohort 
A. Zero EFC     B. Expected Family Contribution in First Term 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Cohorts Enrolling Between 2006 and 2009 
Enrolled prior to 2009 Enrolled in 2009 
Variable Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Observation 7908 8183 5434 5073 
A. Students Characteristics 
Female 69% 70% 63% 65% 
Black  34% 46% 33% 48% 
Hispanic  3% 3% 4% 4% 
Other races 8% 9% 7% 7% 
Single parent 8% 8% 7% 6% 
High school graduate 94% 93% 93% 91% 
Disabled 2% 2% 1% 1% 
Age at enrollment 25 26 27 26 
Age over 19 at enrollment 57% 59% 66% 65% 
Zero Expected Family Contribution 57% 61% 62% 71% 
Expected Family Contribution in 
term 1 942 757 874 587 
Pell amount in term 1 1,918 1,578 2,347 1,939 
     
B. Academic outcomes 
GPA term 1 3.09 2.08 3.13 1.98 
GPA year 1 2.89 1.97 2.93 1.89 
Credits earned term 1 14 6 13 6 
Credits earned year 1 25 11 26 11 
Enrolled first summer 29% 15% 41% 17% 
Credits enrolled first summer 2 1 3 1 
Credits earned first summer 2 1 3 1 
Earned over 6 credits in summer 15% 4% 25% 7% 
Earned certificate within 2.5 year 5.3% 1.7% 6.1% 1.5% 
Earned diploma within 2.5  year 3.4% 0.9% 3.9% 0.6% 
Earned associate within 2.5  year 4.5% 0.5% 5.7% 0.5% 
    
C. Employment  
Ever employed 1 year prior to 
college 73% 77% 67% 69% 
Earnings if employed 1 year prior 
to college 6,576 7,632 6,520 6,662 
















Credits earned term 1 14.1 
Credits earned term 2 14.5 
Credits earned term 3 8.0 
Credits enrolled first summer 8.4 
Earned over 6 credits in summer 71% 
  
Pell amount in term 1 2,315 
Pell amount in term 2 2,320 








Table 3.3: DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP on Outcomes in the First Summer 
Outcomes   
Post*Full-





1. Pell amount in summer 321*** [13] 26,598 
312*** [13] 26,598 X 
488*** [48] 2,632 X 
469*** [46] 2,632 X X 
2. Took class in Summer 0.093*** [0.010]  26,598      
0.083*** [0.010] 26,598 X 
0.164*** [0.034] 2,632 X 
0.144*** [0.032]  2,632  X X 
3. Credits Earned in Summer 0.768*** [0.074] 26,598 
0.698*** [0.069] 26,598 X 
1.393*** [0.265] 2,632 X 
1.287*** [0.253] 2,632 X X 
4.Earned over 6 credits in 
Summer 
0.060*** [0.007]  26,598      
0.055*** [0.007] 26,598 X 
0.117*** [0.026] 2,632 X 
0.115*** [0.025]  2,632  X X 
 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator 
variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates controlled for race, gender, high school 
graduation status, grades point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in 
the first term, intent at college entry, college and major fixed effects. Credits earned in the first term is not included as an 
covariate when it is the outcome variable.  *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * 





Table 3.4: DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP on Academic Outcomes in the First 3 Years 
Outcomes   
Post*Full-





1.Credits Earned in Fall 0.101 [0.092] 26,598 
-0.003 [0.089] 26,598 X 
-0.098 [0.317] 2,632 X 
-0.134 [0.312] 2,632 X X 
2. Credits Earned in the Spring 0.278** [0.134]  26,598      
0.029 [0.116] 26,598 X 
0.141 [0.458] 2,632 X 
-0.084 [0.407]  2,632  X X 
3. Earned Certificate in 1 year 0.005* [0.003] 26,598 
0.003 [0.003] 26,598 X 
0.032** [0.015] 2,632 X 
0.034** [0.015] 2,632 X X 
4. Earned Diploma in 2.5 years 0.006* [0.003]  26,598      
0.005 [0.003] 26,598 X 
-0.011 [0.011] 2,632 X 
-0.011 [0.011]  2,632  X X 
5. Earned Associate in 2.5 
years 
  
0.011*** [0.004] 26,598 
0.007* [0.004] 26,598 X 
0.011 [0.012] 2,632 X 
  0.010 [0.013]  2,632  X X 
 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator 
variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates controlled for race, gender, high school 
graduation status, grades point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in 
the first term, intent at college entry, college and major fixed effects. Credits earned in the first term is not included as an 
covariate when it is the outcome variable.  *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * 





Table 3.5: DID Estimates of the effect of YRP on Financial Aid Outcomes in the First Year 






1. Loan in the Fall 19 [16] 26,598 
7 [15] 26,598 X 
-24 [49] 2,632 X 
-27 [48] 2,632 X X 
2. Loan in the Spring 37** [18] 26,598     
23 [17] 26,598 X 
-75 [59] 2,632 X 
-69 [57] 2,632 X X 
3. Loan in the Summer -1 [7] 26,598 
-3 [7] 26,598 X 
4 [24] 2,632 X 
13 [24] 2,632 X X 
4. Other aid in the Fall (non-Pell or 
loan) 
64*** [18] 26,598     
71*** [17] 26,598 X 
36 [46] 2,632 X 
37 [42] 2,632 X X 
5.Other aid in the Spring -145*** [12] 26,598 
-142*** [11] 26,598 X 
-116*** [37] 2,632 X 
-121*** [36] 2,632 X X 
6. Other aid in the Summer -4** [2] 26,598     
-6*** [2] 26,598 X 
-5 [7] 2,632 X 
  -7 [7] 2,632 X X 
 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator 
variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates controlled for race, gender, high school 
graduation status, grades point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in 
the first term, intent at college entry, college and major fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 








Table 3.6: DID Estimates of the effect of YRP on Labor Market Outcomes in the First Year 





1. Employed in the Fall 0.024* [0.012] 26,598 
0.037*** [0.012] 26,598 X 
0.029 [0.040] 2,632 X 
0.044 [0.040] 2,632 X X 
2. Employed in the Spring -0.003 [0.012] 26,598     
0.009 [0.012] 26,598 X 
-0.035 [0.040] 2,632 X 
-0.035 [0.040] 2,632 X X 
3. Employed in the Summer -0.021* [0.012] 26,598 
-0.010 [0.012] 26,598 X 
-0.026 [0.041] 2,632 X 
-0.023 [0.040] 2,632 X X 
4. Earnings in the Fall 97* [56] 26,598     
146*** [55] 26,598 X 
162 [197] 2,632 X 
152 [196] 2,632 X X 
5. Earnings in the Spring 26 [103] 26,598 
96 [100] 26,598 X 
135 [383] 2,632 X 
115 [387] 2,632 X X 
6. Earnings in the Summer -35 [60] 26,598 
-7 [59] 26,598 X 
198 [233] 2,632 X 
  121 [231] 2,632 X X 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time enrollment status in the first term.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The 
regressions with covariates controlled for year of work experience and its squared term, race, gender, high school graduation status, grades point average 
and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in the first term, intent at college entry, college and major fixed 





Table 3.7: DID Estimates of the effect of YRP on Labor Market Outcomes in the First 3 
Years 





1. Employed in the 1st year -0.000 [0.012] 26,598     
0.010 [0.011] 26,598 X 
-0.011 [0.039] 2,632 X 
-0.007 [0.039] 2,632 X X 
2. Employed in the 2nd year -0.002 [0.011] 26,598 
0.007 [0.011] 26,598 X 
0.007 [0.038] 2,632 X 
0.008 [0.037] 2,632 X X 
3. Employed in the 3rd year -0.001 [0.012] 26,598     
0.009 [0.011] 26,598 X 
-0.022 [0.038] 2,632 X 
-0.018 [0.037] 2,632 X X 
4. Earnings in the 1st year 80 [201] 26,598     
227 [195] 26,598 X 
486 [739] 2,632 X 
375 [738] 2,632 X X 
5. Earnings in the 2nd year 310 [263] 26,598 
407 [265] 26,598 X 
1,172 [990] 2,632 X 
953 [959] 2,632 X X 
6. Earnings in the 3rd year 609*** [184] 26,598     
681*** [179] 26,598 X 
1,433** [648] 2,632 X 
  1,390** [637] 2,632 X X 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time enrollment status in the first term.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The 
regressions with covariates controlled for year of work experience and its squared term, race, gender, high school graduation status, grades point average 
and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in the first term, intent at college entry, college and major fixed 





Table 3.8: DID Estimates of the effect of YRP by Gender 




1. Pell amount in summer 291*** [16] 18,015 Women 
349*** [21] 8,583 Men 
456*** [65] 1,518 Women X 
444*** [67] 1,114 Men X 
2. Credits Earned in Summer 0.706*** [0.084] 18,015 Women 
0.630*** [0.120] 8,583 Men 
1.598*** [0.354] 1,518 Women X 
0.704* [0.374] 1,114 Men X 
3. Earned Certificate in 1 year 0.004 [0.003] 18,015 Women 
0.003 [0.007] 8,583 Men 
0.058*** [0.020] 1,518 Women X 
-0.005 [0.023] 1,114 Men X 
4. Earned Diploma in 2.5 years 0.008** [0.004] 18,015 Women 
-0.001 [0.006] 8,583 Men 
0.005 [0.014] 1,518 Women X 
-0.024 [0.018] 1,114 Men X 
5. Earned Associate in 2.5 years 0.003 [0.004] 18,015 Women 
0.012* [0.007] 8,583 Men 
0.017 [0.017] 1,518 Women X 
-0.006 [0.020] 1,114 Men X 
5. Employed in the Fall 0.043*** [0.015] 18,015 Women 
0.033 [0.021] 8,583 Men 
0.034 [0.056] 1,518 Women X 
0.080 [0.059] 1,114 Men X 
6. Earnings in the Fall 107* [65] 18,015 Women 
304*** [100] 8,583 Men 
71 [285] 1,518 Women X 
414 [293] 1,114 Men X 
7. Employed in the 3rd year -0.005 [0.013] 18,015 Women 
0.029 [0.019] 8,583 Men 
-0.043 [0.052] 1,518 Women X 
-0.009 [0.056] 1,114 Men X 
8. Earnings in the 3rd year 706*** [204] 18,015 Women 
641* [355] 8,583 Men 
872 [811] 1,518 Women X 
1,310 [1,072] 1,114 Men X 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator 
variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. All regressions controlled for race, gender, high school graduation status, 
grades point average and credits earned in the first term, EFC and Pell grant amount in the first term, intent at college entry, 
college and major fixed effects. Panel 5 to 8 also include year of work experience and its squared term as covariates.*** 




Table 3.9: DID Estimates of the effect of YRP by Age at Enrollment 






1. Pell amount in summer 396*** [17] 16,300 ≥20 
190*** [18] 10,298 <20 
481*** [53] 1,929 ≥20 X 
419*** [97] 703 <20 X 
2. Credits Earned in Summer 0.871*** [0.095] 16,300 ≥20   
0.365*** [0.096] 10,298 <20 
1.371*** [0.303] 1,929 ≥20 X 
0.788 [0.484] 703 <20 X 
3. Earned Certificate in 1 year 0.008* [0.004] 16,300 ≥20 
-0.006* [0.004] 10,298 <20 
0.046** [0.018] 1,929 ≥20 X 
0.000 [0.022] 703 <20 X 
4. Earned Diploma in 2.5 years 0.007 [0.005] 16,300 ≥20   
0.001 [0.004] 10,298 <20 
-0.022 [0.014] 1,929 ≥20 X 
0.008 [0.014] 703 <20 X 
5. Earned Associate in 2.5 years 0.010* [0.005] 16,300 ≥20 
-0.002 [0.004] 10,298 <20 
0.002 [0.015] 1,929 ≥20 X 
0.029 [0.023] 703 <20 X 
5. Employed in the Fall 0.028* [0.015] 16,304 ≥20   
0.076*** [0.019] 10,294 <20 
0.043 [0.046] 1,929 ≥20 X 
0.075 [0.085] 703 <20 X 
6. Earnings in the Fall 209*** [79] 16,304 ≥20 
190*** [53] 10,294 <20 
203 [247] 1,929 ≥20 X 
208 [234] 703 <20 X 
7. Employed in the 3rd year 0.015 [0.014] 16,304 ≥20   
0.002 [0.017] 10,294 <20 
-0.029 [0.043] 1,929 ≥20 X 
0.036 [0.078] 703 <20 X 
8. Earnings in the 3rd year 1,330*** [254] 16,304 ≥20 
-305 [226] 10,294 <20 
1,497* [783] 1,929 ≥20 X 
  1,429 [1,149] 703 <20 X 
Note: Each row is a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specification includes post-2008 indicator 
variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. All regressions controlled for race, gender, high school graduation 
status, grades point average and credits earned in the first term, EFC and Pell grant amount in the first term, intent at college 
entry, college and major fixed effects. Panel 5 to 8 also include year of work experience and its squared term as covariates. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
